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COMMENT
HOLLAND v. FLORIDA: A PRISONER’S LAST
CHANCE, ATTORNEY ERROR, AND THE
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH
PENALTY ACT’S ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW
Marni von Wilpert*
When should a prisoner be held accountable for his attorney’s
negligence or misconduct? Since the mid-1990’s, courts throughout the
nation were deciding this question, after a growing tide of attorneys failed
to meet the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year
statute of limitations when filing federal habeas corpus petitions on behalf
of their incarcerated clients. In Holland v. Florida, the Supreme Court
decided once and for all when a prisoner would be given another chance to
file his habeas corpus petition through the doctrine of equitable tolling
when the only reason his petition was late was the fault of his attorney.
This Comment explores the issues raised by the Holland decision. In doing
so, this Comment analyzes the principles of agency law and professional
responsibility—the foundations of the attorney-client relationship—and
raises questions as to whether these principles are properly applied to
incarcerated clients in the post-conviction context. This Comment
ultimately concludes that while Holland was properly decided, the Court
misapplied agency law to support its decision and did not go far enough in
extending the protection of equitable tolling to all prisoners who have been
turned away from the courts because they detrimentally relied on their
defaulting attorneys.

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, University of
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tremendous support and encouragement. I would not be the student I am today, and the
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INTRODUCTION
In February of 1996, Raymond Powell and James Wright engaged in an
argument with Aaron Jones and Marquise McVea that escalated and ended
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in gunfire.1 After the shooting stopped, McVea was dead and Jones was
injured. Raymond Powell was convicted of murder and attempted murder
and sentenced to ninety-five years in prison.2 Jones, the attempted murder
victim, testified at Powell’s trial that he was an innocent victim and that he
did not possess or draw a weapon at any time during the altercation.3 One
year later, Jones testified as a defense witness in an unrelated handgun
prosecution. In that case, Jones changed his story and testified that he did
in fact have a gun on his person the day McVea was killed, but that he did
not draw his weapon.4 Two months later at James Wright’s trial, Jones
ultimately testified that he and McVea were both drug dealers, that the
verbal altercation with Powell and Wright was over drug turf, that
everybody including himself had drawn their guns, and that he had
previously lied under oath.5
In light of Jones’s new testimony, Powell requested an attorney so that he
could pursue post-conviction relief on the grounds that newly discovered
evidence entitled him to a new trial.6 The trial court appointed a public
defender.7 In 2000, Powell’s attorney filed a motion for post-conviction
relief in the trial court. The court then ordered discovery relating to Jones’s
perjured testimony.8 Powell’s attorney then requested an indefinite stay on
the proceedings and told Powell that his case was “on hold until I can get to
it which will be awhile since I have at least 23 unreviewed cases ahead of
you.”9 Powell wrote to his attorney several times about his case. Each
time, his attorney responded that he still had other cases to finish before he
could review Powell’s case.10 Two years later, Powell’s attorney still had
not made any progress on his case and his petition was dismissed by the
court.11
Powell then filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus in federal court in
2002.12 However, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) provides that state and federal prisoners have only one year
from the date their convictions become final to file habeas petitions in
federal court.13 Powell’s convictions became final in 1999, and in the two

1. Powell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Ind. 1999).
2. Id. at 625.
3. Id. at 626.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 2005).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The procedural mechanism for filing a federal habeas petition challenging a state
court’s judgment is 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). The analogous provision for federal prisoners
is found in id. § 2255.
13. Id. § 2244(d)(1). The corresponding limitations period for prisoners in federal
custody is id. § 2255.
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years that his attorney was neglecting his case, the statute of limitations for
federal court had run.14
Since the Indiana Supreme Court had affirmed his conviction,15 a federal
habeas corpus petition was Powell’s last option for post-conviction relief.
The district court appointed a new attorney, who argued that Powell’s
circumstances warranted the equitable tolling16 of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations because the only reason his petition was late was his previous
attorney’s negligence in permitting his case to languish.17 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied Powell’s plea, reasoning that
attorney error is attributable to the client and thus is not a circumstance that
will excuse an untimely petition.18 The court held that counsel’s failure to
do any work on the case was either negligence or legal error, but in neither
case would it warrant equitable tolling.19
Because of his attorney’s negligence, Powell was out of time. His
conviction stands, and Raymond Powell will spend the rest of his life in
prison.
Powell’s case illustrates the recent legal controversy among the federal
appellate courts that the Supreme Court finally decided in Holland v.
Florida.20 This Comment discusses one of the central questions the Court
addressed in Holland: when a prisoner’s failure to file a timely habeas
corpus petition is solely the fault of the prisoner’s criminal defense
attorney, should the courts deny the petition as untimely, or alternatively,
use their equitable powers to give the prisoner another chance and allow his
petition to be heard on the merits?21 In a divided opinion, the Court held
that if an attorney’s conduct in failing to file a timely petition rises to the
level of professional misconduct, equitable tolling may be warranted.22
An analysis of the Holland decision requires a basic understanding of the
issues raised in the case. Part I of this Comment discusses the enactment of
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period, and the subsequent trend
of defense attorney default in failing to meet the statutory filing deadline.
This part also reviews the doctrine of equitable tolling as it applies in the
AEDPA litigation context, as well as the doctrine’s “extraordinary
circumstances” and due diligence requirements. Because the Court relies
on agency law in the Holland decision, Part I includes a discussion of
agency law as the foundation of the attorney-client relationship, and the
implications of the Holland decision for prisoners who detrimentally rely
14. Powell, 415 F.3d at 726.
15. Powell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 624, 630 (Ind. 1999).
16. Equitable tolling is an equitable remedy the court can use to allow the prisoner
another chance to file a habeas petition, even though the statutory limitations period has
passed, if in the particular situation, applying the statute rigidly would be fundamentally
unfair to the prisoner. See infra Part I.B.
17. Powell, 415 F.3d at 726.
18. Id. at 727.
19. Id.
20. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
21. Id. at 2554.
22. Id.
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on their attorneys to further their habeas corpus claims. Part II details the
factual backdrop of the Holland decision, discusses the arguments each
party raised in their respective briefs, and explores the majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the Holland decision and
evaluates the rationales set forth by the various opinions. Finally, Part IV
concludes by proposing an alternative rule to the negligence/misconduct
standard recognized in Holland. This Comment instead recommends a
balanced approach to equitable tolling that permits prisoners’ habeas
petitions to be heard on the merits, while deterring attorney default through
the direct enforcement of the rules of professional conduct.
I. AEDPA’S ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE ALARMING
TREND OF ATTORNEYS WHO FAIL TO MEET ITS DEADLINE
Part I.A briefly discusses the history and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus and AEDPA’s establishment of a one-year statute of limitations
period on federal habeas corpus review. This part also explains the
practical need for competent attorney involvement in filing meritorious
federal habeas corpus petitions. This part also illustrates, however, the
disconcerting trend of attorney default in meeting the limitations deadline
since AEDPA’s enactment. Part I.B describes the Supreme Court’s preHolland jurisprudence in cases of attorney default in meeting AEDPA’s
one-year deadline, including the extraordinary circumstances and due
diligence requirements. Part I.B also discusses the circuit split that led to
the Holland decision as well as the Court’s reliance on agency law to draw
a distinction between simple attorney negligence and egregious misconduct
when determining whether to give a prisoner a second chance by allowing
his untimely habeas corpus petition to be heard on the merits.
A. Attorney Default in Meeting the One-Year Limitations Period for
Federal Habeas Corpus Review
Lawyers are professionals who are trusted with the societal responsibility
of promoting and implementing the administration of justice.23 However,
in the past fourteen years since a statute of limitations was placed on federal
habeas corpus review, criminal defense attorneys throughout the nation
have failed to file their clients’ federal habeas corpus petitions on time. An
understanding of the underlying purpose of the writ of habeas corpus and
the lawyer’s role in habeas proceedings is integral to a full analysis of the
Holland decision. This part discusses AEDPA’s one-year statute of
limitations on federal habeas corpus petitions, and the consequences for
incarcerated clients when their attorneys fail to meet AEDPA’s deadline.

23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Introduction (2000).
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1. The Lawyer’s Role in Habeas Corpus Proceedings: The Need for
Competent Attorneys
In the last thirty years, the number of prisoners in the United States has
increased dramatically. In 1972, roughly 330,000 people were incarcerated,
and by 2006 there were about 2.3 million people in jails and prisons.24 Yet
despite the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel,25
criminal defense systems for indigent defendants routinely operate at
substandard levels and provide defendants with gravely inadequate
representation.26 Due to an increase in the number of criminal defendants
and a decrease in the adequacy of indigent representation, many defendants
face an increased risk of wrongful conviction.27 As a result, many people
have likely been wrongly imprisoned due to ineffective legal assistance.28
For example, a report on indigent defense systems produced by the
American Bar Association (ABA) estimated that the national annual
number of wrongful convictions in serious felony cases may be as high as
10,000.29
The increased risk of wrongful convictions makes access to federal
habeas corpus review essential, as it is often a prisoner’s last chance to
appeal an unjust incarceration. Accordingly, the fundamental purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to protect the fundamental right to liberty.30

24. See Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 340 (2006); see also
Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 336–337 (2009)
(noting that “[t]he number of incarcerated Americans increased by a factor of seven between
1970 and 2007, resulting in 1 of every 131 Americans being incarcerated in prison or jail by
mid-year 2007”); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS vi (1995), available at
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/criminal&CISOPTR=
103 (predicting that habitual offender statutes and “three strikes” laws are likely to increase
the proportion of prisoners with life sentences and thus increase the total prison population
as fewer prisoners are exiting prison systems).
25. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that “the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel”) (citing McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
26. See AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST
FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE]; see also Dennis E.
Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615,
1619 (2002).
27. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 38; see generally Bruce A. Green,
Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169
(2003).
28. See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 344–45 (“[E]xamples abound of capital defendants
represented by sleeping attorneys, drunk attorneys, attorneys largely unfamiliar with death
penalty law and procedure, and attorneys who otherwise could not provide the assurance of
reliability or fairness that criminal proceedings require.”) (internal citations omitted); see
also Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at 1619 (explaining that many defense attorneys cannot
spend adequate time on each client by describing one lawyer who was assigned 1600
misdemeanor cases in a single year).
29. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 3.
30. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400–02 (1963) (stating that the writ of habeas corpus is
“inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty”).
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Thus the writ of habeas corpus is used to prevent unlawful detention by
ensuring that a person is not in custody in violation of the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.31 The writ of habeas corpus is not a
direct appellate review of a criminal proceeding;32 rather it is a prisonerinitiated civil action, which provides collateral review of the legality of
criminal judgments.33 In a habeas proceeding, both state and federal
prisoners may petition a federal court to determine whether the
imprisonment violates their constitutional rights.34
Prisoners may, if they desire, proceed in habeas litigation pro se.
However, commentators have found that, in general, pro se petitioners
cannot successfully navigate the complex habeas corpus procedures. For
example, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association once remarked
that “[v]irtually all habeas corpus petitioners are prisoners. Many are
illiterate, ignorant, and confused. Some are retarded, mentally ill, insane, or
physically incapacitated. To them, the legal system is an unintelligible
morass. Indeed, concepts of by-pass, forfeiture, waiver, and exhaustion, as
well as underlying substantive claims, are complicated ideas.”35 Another
commentator noted that proceeding pro se in habeas litigation is impractical
because post-conviction procedures are generally marked by strict factspecific pleading standards, intricate exhaustion requirements, “and other
technical pitfalls that cannot practicably be navigated without highly skilled
counsel.”36
Furthermore, AEDPA’s procedural requirements are so complicated that
they are sometimes misunderstood even by attorneys, let alone pro se
prisoners. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
once commented on the complexity of the statute when it stated that, “Even
with the benefit of legal training, ready access to legal materials and the aid
of four years of additional case law, an informed calculation of [the
prisoner’s] tolling period evaded both his appointed counsel and the
expertise of a federal magistrate judge.”37 Due to its complexity and
resulting confusion, the Supreme Court itself has reviewed AEDPA’s

31. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006).
32. Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 336 (1923) (stating that the “writ of habeas corpus is
not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but an independent civil suit”)
(emphasis omitted).
33. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 16 (2001).
34. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a).
35. The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2216 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 198 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2216] (statement of
Phylis Skloot Bamberger on behalf of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association);
see also Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of the
Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death
Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 451, 481–84 (1990–1991) (noting that
many habeas petitioner “inmates are illiterate, uneducated, mentally impaired, or any
combination of the three”).
36. See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 354.
37. Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002).
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limitations period twelve times since its enactment fourteen years ago.38
Because of its complicated requirements, prisoners are virtually compelled
to entrust their case to an attorney in order to navigate the federal habeas
corpus system.
The assistance of competent criminal defense attorneys is not only
advantageous to providing prisoners with a fair process, but also integral to
the public’s positive perception of the judicial system itself.39 For example,
the Open Society Institute recently published a public opinion study, which
found that a majority of Americans believe the provision of adequate legal
help for those who need it is fundamental to the fair administration of
justice.40 Moreover, the criminal justice system reduces litigation costs and
runs more efficiently when qualified attorneys represent the litigants in
habeas proceedings.41 For these reasons, and the important purpose of
protecting the fundamental right to liberty, it is a practical necessity that
prisoners have the assistance of a competent attorney when filing habeas
corpus petitions.
2. On Your Mark, Get Set, Go!: AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of
Limitations
AEDPA was passed in 1996 due to pressure to reform habeas corpus law
after the perpetrator of the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma federal building
was convicted and sentenced to death.42 Specifically, congressional
representatives sought to end the lengthy appeals in capital cases by
enacting legislation to reduce delay in the completion of death sentences.43
38. See Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and
Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545, 553 (2009).
39. See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 342.
40. BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, OPEN SOC’Y INST. & NAT’L LEGAL AID AND
DEFENDER ASS’N, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MESSAGE FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF
NATIONAL SURVEY 8 (2001), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/
1211996548.53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf.
41. See Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial
Process: Hearing on S. 623 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 89 (1995)
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 623] (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, former Att’y Gen.
of the United States) (“[A]ssignment of competent counsel in post-conviction proceedings
actually speeds capital cases along and reduces their cost.”); see also James A. Cohen,
Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the Court”,
48 BUFF L. REV. 349, 350 (2000) (explaining that “[l]awyers do perform a screening or gatekeeping function for the courts, society, and clients [and] . . . [c]ourts, therefore, have some
assurance that complaints and defenses have some merit”). Furthermore, Congress included
an “opt-in” provision in AEDPA allowing states to take advantage of more restrictive habeas
corpus procedures if they agree to provide post-conviction counsel for prisoners. For a
description of AEDPA’s “opt-in” provision, see generally Burke W. Kappler, Small Favors:
Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the States, and the Right
to Counsel, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467 (2000).
42. Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time: The Need for Equitable Tolling of the Habeas
Corpus Statute of Limitations, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 (2004).
43. See Hearings on S. 623, supra note 41, at 2 (statement of statement of Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch) (arguing that prisoners’ “abuse of habeas corpus litigation, particularly in those cases
involving lawfully imposed death sentences, has . . . drained State criminal justice resources,
and taken a dreadful toll on victims’ families”); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note
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At the time, the popular perception about capital prisoners encompassed the
belief that they filed spurious and repeated habeas corpus petitions as a
tactic for delaying their punishment.44 Indeed, the title of the Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings leading up to AEDPA’s enactment reflected
the congressional sentiment at the time: “Federal Habeas Corpus Reform:
Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial Process.”45 Therefore,
AEDPA was enacted to ensure the finality of state court judgments by
creating procedural barriers to federal review of those judgments.46 In
order to reduce the repeated filings and the delay between them, Congress
included an unprecedented one-year statute of limitations provision for
federal habeas corpus review.47
The focus of this Comment is on the subsequent failure of criminal
defense attorneys to comply with AEDPA’s statutory limitations period.

24, at 21 (stating that concerns about the lengthy process of death penalty cases dominate
policy discussions about habeas corpus reform).
44. See Bellamy, supra note 42, at 10; Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at 1625
(explaining that Congress has codified procedural obstacles to prisoner litigation on the
prevailing view that prisoners complain too much).
45. See Hearings on S. 623, supra note 41, at I.
46. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (reasoning that AEDPA’s purpose is
to “limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and to safeguard the
States’ interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings”); see also Panel
Discussion, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 560, 565 (1996) [hereinafter Panel Discussion] (Professor Larry Yackle stated that,
“The drafters of this bill obviously want this provision to restrict a prisoner’s ability to get an
evidentiary hearing in federal court”); Traum, supra note 38, at 547 (explaining that the
function of AEDPA’s statute of limitations is to “guard[] the door to federal habeas
review”).
47. The one-year limitations period is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006), which
states:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of–
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if
the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized
by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Likewise, the statute of limitations provision for federal prisoners is found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (2006). It is important to note that before AEDPA, neither Congress nor the judiciary
had ever imposed a time limit on federal habeas corpus petitions. See Bellamy, supra note
42, at 12. Instead, the Supreme Court had consistently maintained that the right to habeas
corpus review could not be conditioned on the passage of time. See Day v. McDonough, 547
U.S. 198, 215 (2006) (noting that the Court had repeatedly asserted that “the passage of time
alone could not extinguish the habeas corpus rights of a person subject to unconstitutional
incarceration”) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986)
(declining to adopt a judicial rule which would “condition the grant of relief upon the
passage of time between a conviction and the filing of a petition for federal habeas corpus”).
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The prevalence of this attorney default is evidenced by the fact that virtually
every federal appellate court has addressed this topic in lengthy opinions,
many of them on multiple occasions.48 Moreover, this problem became an
issue of national concern to the point that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Holland v. Florida to determine whether equitable tolling of
AEDPA’s statute of limitations is warranted in cases of attorney default.49
There are a variety of explanations for this trend of defense attorney
default, ranging from the inability of appointed counsel to manage
abysmally large caseloads,50 to the active misconduct of attorneys who take
their clients’ retainers and run.51 In Holland, the aggrieved prisoner asked
the Court to apply equitable tolling in his case, which would give him an
opportunity to have his habeas petition heard on the merits, after his
attorney refused to answer his letters and phone calls over a period of two
years, during which time AEDPA’s limitations period elapsed.52 Attorney
error in calculating the one-year period also accounts for a large portion of
the number of late habeas filings.53 This Comment does recognize and
commend the incredibly hardworking public defenders and criminal defense
attorneys who have unimaginably large case loads and work tirelessly to
serve their clients. But regardless of the reason for their attorneys’ failures,
prisoners around the country have been asking the federal courts for
equitable tolling to give them a chance to have their habeas petitions heard
on the merits after their attorneys fail. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
developed a two-prong rule for applying equitable tolling in AEDPA
litigation generally. A brief explanation of this rule is necessary to
understand its application to cases of attorney default, as the Court did in
Holland. The next part of this Comment describes the Supreme Court’s
equitable tolling jurisprudence in AEDPA litigation and the particular
48. See, e.g., Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2008); Fleming v. Evans, 481
F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2007); Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2007); Sellers v. Burt,
168 Fed. App’x 132 (8th Cir. 2006); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003);
Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2003); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343 (1st Cir.
2003); Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2002); Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d
133 (2d Cir. 2001); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2000); Miller v. N.J. State
Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998).
49. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted 130 S. Ct.
398 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 09-5327).
50. See Panel Discussion, supra note 46, at 563 (stating that due to the complicated
pleading requirements of a habeas petition a one-year period will be “nearly impossible to
comply with”).
51. See, e.g., Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 797–800 (deciding whether equitable tolling applied
when an attorney took the prisoner’s fee payment and had not done any work on the case for
over a year).
52. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554–60 (2010).
53. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) (deciding whether an
attorney’s mistaken belief about the triggering of AEDPA’s limitations period should excuse
the prisoner’s late petition); see also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2002);
Smaldone, 273 F.3d at 138–39. As discussed in Part II infra, one of Holland’s attorney’s
many errors included miscalculating Holland’s AEDPA time period. See Holland, 130 S. Ct.
at 2558. Indeed, due to the statute’s complexity and resulting confusion, the Supreme Court
itself has reviewed AEDPA’s limitations period twelve times since its enactment over
thirteen years ago. See Traum, supra note 38, at 553.
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evidentiary requirements that a prisoner must meet in order to obtain
equitable relief from his attorney’s failure to file his habeas petition in a
timely fashion.
B. Development of a Doctrine: The Use of Agency Law in Applying
Equitable Tolling to Cases of Attorney Default
Equitable tolling is a remedy that may be awarded at the discretion of
the court and allows a petitioner to assert a claim after the statutory
limitations period has expired.54 This doctrine permits a court to toll a
statutory limitations period in situations where the strict enforcement of the
statute would operate unfairly or result in gross injustice.55 Thus courts
have used their discretion to equitably toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations
when a habeas petitioner “has been unfairly prevented from asserting his
rights in a timely fashion.”56 In adjudicating whether a prisoner was
unfairly prevented from filing a timely habeas petition, it is the litigant’s
reason for the late filing that is scrutinized by the court.57
As was the story in Holland, in the past fourteen years since AEDPA’s
enactment there has been a growing trend of equitable tolling requests from
prisoners who wish to have their untimely federal habeas corpus petitions
heard on the merits. In many cases, their reason for requesting equitable
tolling is the negligent representation of their post-conviction attorneys.58
As the Supreme Court held in Coleman v. Thompson,59 there is no Sixth
Amendment right to post-conviction counsel, thus there is no ineffective
assistance of counsel remedy in this context.60 Therefore, a prisoner’s only
avenue to obtaining relief from his attorney’s negligent representation is an
appeal to the courts for equitable tolling.
The Supreme Court first addressed this specific issue—namely the
equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations period on grounds of attorney
default—in its 2007 decision in Lawrence v. Florida.61 Without actually
54. Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710,
713 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that courts “can allow an untimely petition to proceed under the
doctrine of equitable tolling”).
55. See, e.g., Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[E]quity must be
reserved for those rare instances where . . . it would be unconscionable to enforce the
limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.”); Miller v. N.J. State
Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that equitable tolling is only applied
when the rigid application of the limitations period would be unfair).
56. Nara, 264 F.3d at 320.
57. Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2007) (“In applying the equitable tolling
doctrine, an important factor is the reason for the late filing.”).
58. See, e.g., Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting petitioner’s
argument that the state public defender’s negligence warranted equitable tolling); Smaldone
v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that petitioner sought equitable
tolling because of his attorney’s mistaken belief about the AEDPA statute).
59. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
60. Id. at 752 (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings.”).
61. 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (noting the petitioner’s argument that “his counsel’s
mistake in miscalculating [AEDPA’s] limitations period entitles him to equitable tolling”).

1440

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

deciding whether AEDPA was subject to equitable tolling, the Court
articulated the following rule in Lawrence: “To be entitled to equitable
tolling, [the petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’
and prevented timely filing.”62 Although the Court stated that it was not yet
deciding whether equitable tolling was applicable to AEDPA’s statute of
limitations,63 this rule had been followed by the district courts and circuit
courts of appeals since the late 1990s,64 almost a decade before Lawrence
was decided. This rule was reaffirmed by the Court three years later in
Holland, when it formally decided that AEDPA’s limitations period was
subject to equitable tolling.65
1. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Attorney’s Behavior
In habeas corpus litigation, a prisoner is eligible for the remedy of
equitable tolling only if he can prove that “extraordinary circumstances”
prevented him from filing his habeas corpus petition on time.66 Although
62. Id. at 336 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
63. Before the Court decided to apply equitable tolling in certain cases of attorney
default, it had to determine whether equitable tolling was applicable to AEDPA’s limitations
period at all. The circuit courts of appeals had been applying equitable tolling to AEDPA’s
limitations period since the late 1990s, and this issue was argued and finally decided in
Holland. See infra Part II for a description of Holland’s treatment of this issue. The issue of
whether AEDPA should be subject to equitable tolling at all is beyond the scope of this
Comment, and indeed has been the sole subject of many pre-Holland academic discussions
and articles. The focus of this Comment, rather, is directed toward the attorney-client
relationship in the post-conviction habeas corpus context, and the ever-increasing prevalence
of substandard legal representation that requires the extraordinary remedy of equitable
tolling in order to maintain the procedural fairness that the justice system demands. For
further discussions of equitable tolling’s general applicability to AEDPA’s statute of
limitations, see generally Bellamy, supra note 42; Stevenson, supra note 24; Traum, supra
note 38.
64. See, e.g., Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) (“This Court has
used equitable tolling to extend the federal limitations period for prisoners seeking federal
review of their state convictions . . . .”); Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir.
2007) (“[S]ufficiently egregious misconduct on the part of a habeas petitioner’s counsel may
justify equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period.”); Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53,
59 (1st Cir. 2007) (“In this circuit, we have allowed for equitable tolling of [AEDPA’s]
limitations period . . . .”); United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“‘The statute of limitations contained in § 2255 [AEDPA] is subject to equitable tolling.’”
(quoting United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004))); Spitsyn v. Moore,
345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas
petition may be equitably tolled . . . .”); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2001)
(stating that the court has discretion to apply principles of equity in AEDPA); Harris v.
Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2000) (“As a general matter, principles of equitable
tolling may . . . apply to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with the strict requirements of
[AEDPA’s] statute of limitations.”); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000)
(proclaiming that the Second Circuit agrees that AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling);
Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that under AEDPA, “[a]
court can allow an untimely petition to proceed under the doctrine of equitable tolling”).
65. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (holding that AEDPA’s statute of
limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006), is subject to equitable tolling).
66. Id. at 2563; Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007); Pace v. DiGuglielmo,
544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
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there is no single definition of “extraordinary circumstances,” courts have
generally required that they be situations that are beyond the prisoner’s
ability to control.67 For example, courts have allowed equitable tolling in
AEDPA litigation when a court itself misled a prisoner about the habeas
petition process,68 when a government official misled a prisoner,69 when a
prisoner was denied access to his legal files,70 and when deficiencies in a
prison library prevented a diligent pro se prisoner from learning about the
limitations period.71 In these situations, prisoners were misled or
obstructed by a state official, and thus the reasons for these prisoners’
untimely filings were beyond their control.72
As was the case in Holland, many prisoners cite their attorney’s
negligent or intentional bad faith conduct as extraordinary circumstances
that prevented them from complying with AEDPA’s statutory limitations
period. Requesting equitable tolling on these grounds, however, led the
Court in Holland to make a stark departure from its historical jurisprudence
regarding claims of substandard legal representation. Outside of the postconviction habeas corpus context, and indeed largely outside of the criminal
justice context as a whole,73 the Court has disposed of similar claims of
67. See, e.g., Barreto-Barreto v. United States, 551 F.3d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 2008)
(“[P]etitioners carry the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary circumstances beyond
their control ‘prevented timely filing.’” (quoting Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 25
(1st Cir. 2001))); Downs, 520 F.3d at 1319 (citing Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th
Cir. 2000)) (explaining that the court’s precedents require not only extraordinary
circumstances, but circumstances that are beyond the petitioner’s control); Spitsyn, 345 F.3d
at 799 (holding that “the one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition may be
equitably tolled if ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it
impossible to file a petition on time’” (quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1202
(9th Cir. 2003))); Harris, 209 F.3d at 330 (explaining that equitable tolling is only
appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances beyond plaintiffs’ control made it
impossible to file the claims on time’” (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d
696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996))).
68. See, e.g., Prieto v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d 511, 514–15 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying
equitable tolling because petitioner detrimentally relied on a misleading filing extension
granted by the district court when filing his habeas petition).
69. Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 710, 712 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that equitable
tolling was warranted when a government official, the Clerk of the State Supreme Court, had
misled a petitioner about the habeas filing procedure).
70. Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2002).
71. See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that equitable
tolling would be warranted by the extraordinary circumstances a prisoner faced while
attempting to access the prison library to do legal research in order to determine his AEDPA
deadline).
72. Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that when a court
misled the prisoner about the filing deadline, the prisoner’s subsequent late filing was “not
his fault”).
73. At the criminal trial level, for example, criminal defendants are not bound to the
consequences of their attorney’s substandard legal representation but instead may obtain a
new trial if their attorney does not perform with “reasonably effective assistance.” See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). However, the Court later clarified in
Coleman v. Thompson that its ruling was not based on the premise that when the attorney’s
errors are egregious the attorney ceases to be an agent of the defendant, rather, it is the Sixth
Amendment itself that requires responsibility for the attorney’s default to be imputed to the
state. 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991). Nonetheless, the Strickland precedent still stands and is
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negligent representation resulting in procedural default by invoking agency
law in holding that clients are bound by their attorney’s acts or omissions.74
Since the purpose of habeas corpus is to ensure fairness to prisoners in the
criminal justice system,75 it follows that before Holland, the courts of
appeals and the Supreme Court itself were struggling to determine whether
it was fair to preclude a habeas petition because of attorney error in the
post-conviction process. Accordingly, the courts of appeals developed
varying doctrines to deal with the claims of attorney default in meeting
AEDPA’s limitations period. The Supreme Court finally decided which
approach to adopt in Holland.
Long before Holland was decided, the Supreme Court and every circuit
court of appeals to have decided an equitable tolling case based on a claim
of attorney default held that simple attorney negligence was not an
extraordinary circumstance, and thus did not warrant equitable tolling.76
representative of the Court’s hesitation to hold criminal defendants responsible for the
consequences of their attorney’s failures in many stages of the criminal justice system.
74. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) (precluding equitable
tolling for a petitioner when his attorney failed to file a timely habeas corpus petition on his
behalf); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752–53 (holding that litigants must “bear the risk of attorney
error that results in a procedural default”); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,
91, 96 (1990) (precluding equitable tolling of an employment discrimination law’s
limitations period when a petitioner’s attorney failed to file a timely complaint because the
attorney was not in the country when the limitations period elapsed); Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988) (striking down a litigant’s argument that the attorney’s sins should
not be constructively attributed to the client because “[t]he argument that the client should
not be held responsible for his lawyer’s misconduct strikes at the heart of the attorney-client
relationship”); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634–36 (1962) (holding that a
litigant’s case was dismissed for failure to prosecute when his attorney failed to appear in a
pretrial conference because in “our system of representative litigation . . . each party is
deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent”). See also Cohen, supra note 41, at 349
(noting that “[t]he law of agency has governed American lawyers since before the
Revolution”).
75. See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 16.
76. Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336–37; Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1325 (11th Cir.
2008) (holding that mere attorney negligence does not justify equitable tolling); Trapp v.
Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[M]istake by counsel in reading [AEDPA] or
computing the time limit is, at most, a routine error and does not . . . [warrant] equitable
tolling.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th
Cir. 2007) (“Habeas counsel’s negligence is not generally a basis for equitable tolling . . . .”);
Sellers v. Burt, 168 F. App’x 132, 133 (8th Cir. 2006) (ineffective assistance of counsel
generally does not warrant equitable tolling in habeas proceedings); Modrowski v. Mote, 322
F.3d 965, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that attorney negligence is not grounds for
equitable tolling); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
ordinary attorney negligence will not justify equitable tolling); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343,
346 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that principles of equitable tolling do not extend to excusable
neglect); Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 683 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that an attorney’s
erroneous interpretation of AEDPA’s statute of limitations cannot excuse the prisoner’s
failure to file on time); Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting
that attorney error does not create the extraordinary circumstances equitable tolling
requires); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[A] mistake by a party’s
counsel in interpreting a statute of limitations does not present the extraordinary
circumstance beyond the party’s control where equity should step in . . . .”); Miller v. N.J.
State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 619 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that excusable neglect is not
sufficient justification for equitable tolling).
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Courts have defined attorney negligence to mean an attorney’s mistake in
calculating the limitations period,77 an attorney’s erroneous interpretation of
the statute,78 or other misunderstandings regarding AEDPA’s procedural
requirements that result in untimely habeas filings.79 In these cases, the
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court itself have historically invoked
agency law, reasoning that attorney negligence is not an “extraordinary
circumstance” that prevents a petitioner from filing on time because
prisoners, as principals in the agency relationship, must supervise—and bear
responsibility for—their attorneys’ acts or omissions.80
Although courts have established that simple attorney negligence does
not warrant equitable tolling, the courts of appeals before Holland had a
much harder time deciding what to do when an attorney missed a prisoner’s
AEDPA deadline because of egregious misconduct. Before Holland, the
Supreme Court had never addressed equitable tolling of AEDPA’s
limitations period in the context of an attorney’s affirmative misconduct,81
and the circuit courts of appeals took divergent approaches when
adjudicating these cases. A majority of the circuit courts allowed equitable
tolling in circumstances of attorney misconduct,82 reasoning that
77. See Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336–37 (holding that “[a]ttorney miscalculation is simply
not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling”); David, 318 F.3d at 346 (holding that “a mistake
by counsel in reading the statute or computing the time limit” does not warrant equitable
tolling).
78. See Fierro, 294 F.3d at 683 (holding that an attorney’s erroneous interpretation of
AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision cannot, on its own, excuse the prisoner’s failure to
file on time).
79. See, e.g., Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 245–46, 249–50 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
an attorney’s mistaken belief that the mailbox rule in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e)
applies to AEDPA’s limitations period will not excuse an untimely habeas petition).
80. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) (holding that attorney
error is not grounds to excuse an untimely petition because “the attorney is the petitioner’s
agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation”); Modrowski, 322 F.3d at
968 (“[A]ttorney negligence is not extraordinary and clients, even if incarcerated, must
‘vigilantly oversee,’ and ultimately bear responsibility for, their attorneys’ actions or
failures.” (quoting Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2001))); Harris, 209
F.3d at 331 (“[A] mistake by a party’s counsel in interpreting a statute of limitations does not
present the extraordinary circumstance beyond the party’s control where equity should step
in.”).
81. See Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336 (addressing the question of whether an attorney’s
error in miscalculating AEDPA’s limitations period entitles the petitioner to equitable
tolling).
82. See, e.g., Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that
“serious attorney misconduct may constitute an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of
equitable tolling”); Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
“sufficiently egregious misconduct on the part of a habeas petitioner’s counsel may justify
equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period”); United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089,
1093 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[S]erious attorney misconduct, as opposed to mere negligence, ‘may
warrant equitable tolling.’”) (quoting Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 2002));
Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that sufficiently
egregious misconduct may justify the use of equitable tolling); Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d
1086, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that “there are instances in which an attorney’s failure to
take necessary steps to protect his client’s interests is so egregious and atypical that the court
may deem equitable tolling appropriate”); United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226, 230 (5th
Cir. 2002) (holding that an attorney’s deception is the sort of extraordinary circumstance that
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misconduct is not attributable to the client because such attorney behavior
constitutes the “extraordinary circumstances” required for equitable tolling.
Again, while there is no single definition of attorney misconduct, courts
have found misconduct occurs where the prisoner requests or demands that
the attorney file a habeas petition, but for a variety of reasons the attorney
never does. For example, courts have found misconduct when an attorney
affirmatively misleads the prisoner about the law,83 effectively abandons
the case,84 or blatantly deceives or lies to his client about the status of his
case.85 When granting equitable tolling in these circumstances, some courts
have once again invoked agency law, reasoning that if an attorney acts in a
manner completely adverse to the client, the attorney no longer functions as
the client’s agent, rendering it improper to bind these incarcerated clients to
the consequences of their attorney’s actions.86 As discussed in Part II
supra, some of the Justices adopted this agency law reasoning in Holland.
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, consistently held that attorney
default, whether due to negligence or misconduct, was always attributed to

could warrant the use of equitable tolling); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that an attorney’s effective abandonment of the case may warrant equitable tolling).
83. Martin, 408 F.3d at 1094 (finding misconduct where an attorney told the prisoner
that “there was no such thing as a one-year filing deadline”).
84. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding misconduct when
an attorney accepted a retainer payment then failed to do any work or respond to prisoner’s
letters or phone calls for over a year, by which time the deadline had lapsed); Nara, 264 F.3d
at 320 (holding that equitable tolling would be justified if the petitioner’s attorney effectively
abandoned the case).
85. Martin, 408 F.3d at 1094 (finding misconduct where the attorney lied to prisoner by
telling him that he had filed the prisoner’s petition, which was not true); Wynn, 292 F.3d at
230 (“Wynn’s allegation that he was deceived by his attorney into believing that a timely
[habeas corpus] motion had been filed on his behalf presents a ‘rare and extraordinary
circumstance’ beyond petitioner’s control that could warrant equitable tolling of the statute
of limitations.”). Notably, some of the courts of appeals found that an attorney’s behavior
constitutes misconduct when an attorney violates the professional duties of care that she
owes to the client. See, e.g., Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 152 (finding misconduct when the
attorney violates the duty of loyalty that she, as an agent, owes to the client); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”).
The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that a
lawyer engages in professional misconduct when she violates or attempts to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct by breaching the duties attorneys owe to clients. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2003). The Court relied on these Model Rules when deciding to
make an exception to agency principles in Strickland, and also adopted the Model Rules
reasoning in Holland, citing an amicus brief written by a group of extremely astute legal
ethics professors. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564–65 (citing Brief for Legal
Ethics Professors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Holland v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2549 (2010) (No. 09-5237)); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)
(referencing the “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association
standards”).
86. See Downs, 520 F.3d at 1321 (holding that “when an attorney’s conduct is so
egregious it amounts to a de facto termination of representation, it would be improper to hold
the client to the actions of his agent”); Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 154 (“[W]hen an ‘agent acts
in a manner completely adverse to the principal’s interest,’ the ‘principal is not charged with
[the] agent’s misdeeds.’”) (Jacobs, J., concurring) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Bonnanzio, 91 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1996))).
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the client and therefore never warranted the use of equitable tolling.87 Even
though attorneys displayed the same unethical conduct as those in other
circuit’s jurisdictions, the results for the prisoner were radically different in
the Seventh Circuit, as prisoners were never granted equitable tolling no
matter how severe the attorney’s misconduct. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in 2009 to finally decide when a habeas petitioner would be
bound by his attorney’s failures.88
Although the Court spent a significant portion of its analysis in Holland
determining whether the attorney’s behavior constituted “extraordinary
circumstances,” the Court also evaluated the second prong of the equitable
tolling analysis—whether the prisoner acted with “due diligence” in
pursuing his rights. The next section of this Comment addresses the
prisoner’s duty to diligently pursue his rights, no matter how poorly the
attorney is handling his case.
2. Due Diligence: The Prisoner’s Behavior
When Albert Holland’s attorney stopped answering his letters and phone
calls, Holland began to worry.89 In an effort to try and force his attorney to
work on his habeas petition, or at least return his letters and phone calls,
Holland contacted the courts, their clerks, and the Florida State Bar
reporting his attorney’s misconduct and asking for information about his
case.90 When Holland learned that his attorney had missed AEDPA’s
deadline, Holland immediately wrote his own pro se habeas motion, and
filed it the next day.91 However, by this time it was too late, and the
District Court dismissed Holland’s petition as untimely.92 The District
Court refused to grant Holland equitable tolling on the grounds that he had
not been diligent enough in pursuing his rights.93
The second prong of the equitable tolling rule, which the Court expressed
in Lawrence and later affirmed in Holland, requires a prisoner to show that
he has been pursuing his rights diligently during the time that his attorney

87. See, e.g., Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2005) (“‘[A]ttorney
misconduct, whether labeled negligent, grossly negligent, or willful, is attributable to the
client’ and thus is not a circumstance beyond a petitioner’s control that might excuse an
untimely petition.”) (quoting Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003));
United States v. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1994) (precluding equitable
tolling because the errors and misconduct of the lawyer redound upon and bind the principal
(i.e., the client)).
88. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted 130 S. Ct.
398 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 09-5327). See also Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560 (“Because the
[Eleventh Circuit] Court of Appeals’ application of the equitable tolling doctrine to instances
of professional misconduct conflicts with the approach taken by other Circuits, we granted
the petition [for certiorari].”).
89. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
90. Id. at 2555–57.
91. Id. at 2557.
92. Id. at 2559.
93. Id.
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was neglecting his case.94 Before Holland, the circuit courts of appeals
treated this due diligence requirement differently, and these divergent
approaches generated an important question: should the context of
imprisonment be taken into account when evaluating a habeas petitioner’s
due diligence?
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, for example, chose not to acknowledge a
prisoner’s conditions of confinement when evaluating the diligence
requirement. In denying a prisoner’s argument that his confinement limited
his ability to pursue his rights diligently, the Fifth Circuit stated that,
“Congress knew AEDPA would affect incarcerated individuals with limited
access to outside information.”95 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held
that a prisoner can overcome even an attorney’s willful misconduct by
diligently pursuing his rights in filing “protective” or duplicative pro se
petitions if he fears his attorney will fail to file a timely petition on his
behalf.96 The facts of Holland, however, make clear that the Seventh
Circuit’s protective petition approach is not necessarily feasible, as every
pro se petition Holland filed was dismissed by the District Court on the
premise that prisoners who are represented by an attorney are not permitted
to file pro se petitions.97
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, did consider the realities of prison
life when evaluating a prisoner’s diligence in pursuing his constitutional
habeas corpus claims. For example, this circuit once remarked that
“confinement makes compliance with procedural deadlines difficult
because of restrictions on the prisoner’s ability to monitor the lawsuit’s
progress.”98 Likewise, commentators and scholars have noted that because
much of the attorney’s factual investigations, legal research, and document
drafting is done outside of the courtroom, it is difficult for prisoners to
monitor their attorneys’ progress on their cases. 99

94. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007). See also Bellamy, supra note 42, at
29 (“[C]ourts frequently hold that despite the existence of extraordinary circumstances,
prisoners’ delays do not warrant equitable tolling because they have not exercised reasonable
diligence in pursuing their claims.”).
95. Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding the prisoner did not act
with the requisite diligence even though the court “recognize[d] that Fisher’s incarceration
prevented him from knowing sooner of AEDPA’s limitation period”).
96. See Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2005); Modrowski v. Mote, 322
F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that “petitioners bear ultimate responsibility for their
[habeas corpus] filings, even if that means preparing duplicative petitions”).
97. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556.
98. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
99. See, e.g., Green, supra note 27, at 1171 (stating that “[i]t is hard for clients
themselves . . . to know most of what happens from the time the lawyer is assigned to
represent an indigent defendant until the time the defendant pleads guilty”); Curtis & Resnik,
supra note 26, at 1620 (noting that in the context of the criminal justice system, “[i]ndividual
clients, in turn, have little or no ability to monitor their own lawyers”).
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II. HOLLAND V. FLORIDA: A CASE ANALYSIS
A. Statement of the Case
Albert Holland’s story began in 1997, when he was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death.100 Although Albert Holland was represented by an
attorney, he filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Florida in January of 2006, approximately
one month after his AEDPA limitations deadline had passed.101 As Holland
had exhausted his state court remedies, a federal habeas corpus petition was
his last chance for judicial review of his conviction before his execution
was to be carried out. Holland asked the District Court to toll the
limitations period on equitable grounds, claiming that his attorney’s
egregious misconduct prevented him from filing his petition on time.102
Eventually, Holland appealed his plea for equitable tolling to the Supreme
Court. For the first time in its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court handed
down a ruling on the equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
In the year 2000, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Holland’s
conviction,103 and on October 1, 2001 the U.S. Supreme Court denied
Holland’s petition for certiorari to review the State Court’s judgment.104
On that date—the date that direct appellate review of Holland’s conviction
became final—AEDPA’s one-year limitations period began to run.105
Approximately one month later, the state of Florida appointed attorney
Bradley Collins to represent Holland in all state and federal post-conviction
matters.106 A full ten months after taking on Holland’s case, Collins filed a
motion for post-conviction relief in a state trial court in September of 2002,
316 days after his appointment as Holland’s attorney, and only 12 days
before the one-year limitations period expired.107 That filing automatically
stopped the running of the clock, as it triggered a statutory tolling provision
for AEDPA’s limitations period.108 Although the limitations period was
not running during Holland’s state post-conviction appeals process, Holland
was left with only twelve days at that point.109
Holland’s petition was pending in the various state courts over the next
three years.110 During that time, Holland wrote Collins many letters
requesting that Collins “make certain that all of his claims would be
100. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
101. Id. at 2554.
102. Id. at 2555.
103. Id. (citing Holland v. State, 773 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 2000)).
104. Id., cert. denied, 534 U.S. 834 (2001).
105. Id. at 2555.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006) (“The time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this
subsection.”).
109. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
110. Id.
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preserved for any subsequent federal habeas corpus review.”111 Collins
wrote back to Holland, stating that “I would like to reassure you that we are
aware of state-time limitations and federal exhaustion requirements” and
instructed Holland that if his state post-conviction motion be denied, “your
state habeas corpus claims will then be ripe for presentation in a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in federal court.”112
The state trial court denied Holland relief in 2003, and Collins appealed
to the Florida Supreme Court.113 That is when Collins’s communication
with his client began to break down. Over the next three years, from April
2003 to January 2006, Collins communicated with Holland only three
times, each time by a letter sent to Holland’s prison.114 Holland became
increasingly unhappy with his attorney’s lack of communication, and wrote
the Florida Supreme Court on two separate occasions, asking it to remove
Collins from his case.115 In the second letter, filed in 2004, Holland
informed the court that “Collins had not kept [him] updated on the status of
[his] capital case” and that Holland “had not seen or spoken to Collins since
April 2003.”116 Holland also wrote that “Collins has abandoned [me]” and
that “Collins has never made any reasonable effort to establish any
relationship of trust or confidence with [me].”117 Holland concluded by
asking the court to dismiss or remove Collins from his capital case.118 As
the opposing party, the State filed a response to Holland’s request, arguing
that Holland could not file any pro se paperwork with the court while he
was represented by counsel—including any requests seeking new counsel
for his case.119 The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the State and
denied Holland’s request for a new attorney.120
After being turned down by the court, Holland then wrote letters to the
Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court asking for assistance in obtaining
information about his case.121 Holland wrote, “I’m not trying to get on
your nerves. I just would like to know exactly what is happening with my
case on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida.”122 He added, “[I]f I had a
competent . . . post-conviction, appellate attorney representing me, I would
not have to write you this letter.”123 During that time, Holland also filed a
complaint against Collins with the Florida Bar Association, but his
complaint was denied.124 Holland then wrote again to the Florida Supreme
Court Clerk requesting copies of the State’s response to his State Habeas
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2556.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Corpus Petition.125 The Clerk responded to Holland’s letter by informing
Holland that he would have to pay for the copies of his records by
“submitt[ing] a check or money order in the amount of $77.00”126 or that
“in lieu of sending money he could contact his attorney for copies or visit
the Court’s webpage.”127 Holland was indigent, so he was not able to send
money for the copies, and, as a death row inmate, he had no access to
computers or the Internet, and thus could not visit the court’s webpage to
obtain information about his case.128 Out of the choices the Clerk presented
to him, the only route of communication Holland had available was through
his attorney.
Meanwhile, without informing Holland, Collins argued Holland’s appeal
before the Florida Supreme Court in February of 2005.129 Holland, who
had been in the dark about his case for over a year at this point, continued to
write his attorney a series of letters “emphasizing the importance of filing a
timely petition for habeas corpus in federal court once the Florida Supreme
Court issued its ruling.”130 On March 3, 2005, Holland wrote:
Dear Mr. Collins, P.A.: How are you? Fine I hope. I write this letter
to ask that you please write me back, as soon as possible to let me know
what the status of my case is on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida.
If the Florida Supreme Court denies my [post-conviction] and State
Habeas Corpus appeals, please file my 28 U.S.C. 2254 writ of Habeas
Corpus petition, before my deadline to file it runs out (expires). Thank
you very much. Please have a nice day.131

Collins did not answer this letter.132 Holland wrote again on June 15,
2005:
Dear Mr. Collins: How are you? Fine I hope. On March 3, 2005 I
wrote you a letter, asking that you let me know the status of my case on
appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida. Also, have you begun preparing
my 28 U.S.C. § 2254 writ of Habeas Corpus petition? Please let me
know, as soon as possible. Thank you.133

Again, Collins did not reply.134
Five months later, in November 2005, the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court decision denying Holland’s motion for postconviction relief.135 On December 1, 2005, the court’s decision became
final when it issued its mandate.136 Once again the AEDPA clock began
125.
5327).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Brief for Petitioner at 9–10, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2459 (2010) (No. 09Id. at 11.
Id. at 12 n.12.
Id. at 2 n.1.
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Holland v. State, 916 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam)).
Id. (citing Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008)).
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ticking, with only twelve days left on the one-year time limit.137 Collins
never informed his client about the court’s decision, and twelve days later
Holland’s AEDPA time limit expired,138 and with it so did his last plea for
judicial review of his conviction and death sentence: his federal writ of
habeas corpus.
Holland, however, was still unaware of the Florida Supreme Court’s
ruling and continued to write his attorney letters asking for information
about his case. In January of 2006, Holland wrote:
Dear Mr. Bradley M. Collins: How are you? Fine I hope. I write this
letter to ask that you please let me know the status of my appeals before
the Supreme Court of Florida. Have my appeals been decided yet?
Please send me the [necessary information] . . . so that I can determine
when the deadline will be to file my 28 U.S.C. Rule 2254 Federal Habeas
Corpus Petition, in accordance with all United States Supreme Court and
Eleventh Circuit case law and applicable ‘Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act,’ if my appeals before the Supreme Court of Florida are
denied. Please be advised that I want to preserve my privilege to federal
review of all of my state convictions and sentences.
Mr. Collins, would you please also inform me as to which United States
District Court my 28 U.S.C. Rule 2254 Federal Habeas Corpus Petition
will have to be timely filed in and that court’s address? Thank you very
much.139

Again, Collins did not answer.140 Nine days later, Holland, while
working in the prison library, learned for the first time that the Florida
Supreme Court had made a decision on his case five weeks ago.141
Immediately, he wrote his own pro se federal habeas corpus petition and
mailed it to the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida
the next day.142 Holland then tried to call Collins from his prison, but he
called collect and Collin’s office refused to accept the call.143
Five days later, Collins wrote Holland a letter and told him that as
Collins understood the AEDPA statue, Holland’s one-year limitations
period had in fact expired in 2000, before Collins had even begun to
represent Holland.144 Collins wrote:
Dear Mr. Holland: I am in receipt of your letter . . . concerning
operation of AEDPA time limitations. One hurdle in our upcoming
efforts to obtain federal habeas corpus relief will be that the one-year
statutory time frame for filing such a petition began to run after [your]
case was affirmed [by the Florida Supreme Court] on October 5, 2000
. . . . However, it was not until November 7, 2001, that I received the
Order appointing me to the case. As you can see, I was appointed about a
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2557 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. (citing Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2557–58.
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year after your case became final . . . . [T]he AEPDA time period [thus]
had run before my appointment and therefore before your [postconviction] motion was filed.145

Collins’s interpretation of the law was wrong.146 Holland’s time clock
had not begun to run until after the Supreme Court denied certiorari on
October 1, 2001.147 Therefore, when Collins was appointed in November
of 2001, the AEDPA clock still had 328 days remaining.148 Holland
immediately wrote back to his attorney informing Collins of his error:
Dear Mr. Collins: I received your letter . . . . You are incorrect in
stating that the one-year statutory time frame for filing my 2254 petition
began to run after my case was affirmed on October 5, 2000, by the
Florida Supreme Court. . . . Also, Mr. Collins you never told me that my
time ran out (expired). I told you to timely file my 28 U.S.C. 2254
Habeas Corpus Petition before the deadline, so that I would not be timebarred. You never informed me of oral arguments or of the Supreme
Court of Florida’s November 10, 2005 decision denying my postconviction appeals. . . . Mr. Collins, please file my 2254 Habeas Petition
immediately. Please do not wait any longer, even though it will be
untimely filed at least it will be filed without wasting anymore [sic] time.
(valuable time).149

Once again, Collins did not answer this letter, nor did he file a federal
habeas petition as his client requested.150
In March of 2006, Holland filed another complaint with the Florida Bar
Association.151 This time, the Bar demanded a response from Collins,
which he provided through his own attorney.152 By that point, Holland had
already filed another pro se petition in the District Court requesting for a
second time that Collins be dismissed from his case.153 Once again, the
State filed a response to Holland’s request and argued that “Holland could
not file a pro se motion seeking to have Collins removed while he was
represented by counsel, i.e., represented by Collins.”154
Fortunately for Holland, this time the court considered Holland’s motion
and allowed Collins to withdraw from the case.155 The court appointed a
new lawyer for Holland and heard arguments as to whether the
circumstances of Holland’s case justified the equitable tolling of AEDPA’s
limitations period for the five weeks that Collins failed to inform his client
about the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that triggered the clock

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 2558.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2559.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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again.156 If the court agreed to equitably toll the limitations period for those
five weeks, Holland’s federal habeas corpus petition would be considered
timely.157
After considering the case, the Federal District Court held that Holland’s
circumstances did not warrant equitable tolling and therefore his petition
was time-barred.158 The court suggested that Holland “was a difficult
client” and that “Collins’ professional conduct in the case was at worst
merely negligent.”159 The court stated that “even if Collins’ behavior could
be characterized as an extraordinary circumstance,” Holland had
nonetheless failed to demonstrate the requisite “due diligence” aspect of the
equitable tolling inquiry because he, among other things, did not seek aid
from outside supporters.160
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court in holding
that Holland’s petition was untimely.161 However, it did not address the
question of Holland’s diligence, but instead held that the facts of Holland’s
case did not warrant equitable tolling because Holland had not met the
second part of the inquiry—namely that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.162 Specifically, the Court of
Appeals stated that Collins’s behavior involved “no more than [p]ure
professional negligence” and that “such behavior [on the part of a
petitioner’s attorney] can never constitute an extraordinary
circumstance.”163
The Supreme Court granted certiorari164 and heard arguments in March
of 2010.165 The next section of this Comment examines the arguments of
the various briefs submitted to the Court.
B. Arguments from the Briefs
1. Albert Holland
In his brief, Holland argued that he had shown sufficient facts to prove he
had been pursuing his rights diligently, and that an “extraordinary
circumstance” stood in his way and prevented him from a timely filing—
namely his attorney, Bradley Collins.166
Holland first addressed the threshold issue of whether AEDPA’s statute
of limitations was actually subject to equitable tolling. Holland cited
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334,
1339 (11th Cir. 2008)).
164. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 398 (2009).
165. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2549.
166. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 27.
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Supreme Court precedent, noting that “[i]t is hornbook law that limitations
periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling.”167 He argued that the
writ of habeas corpus itself has historically been “governed by equitable
principles”168 and that eleven of the federal appellate courts have held that
AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling.169 Most importantly, Holland
pointed to a rich history of case law stating that equitable remedies are
warranted when the rigid application of a rule would “lead to unacceptably
unjust outcomes.”170 Holland next turned his attention to the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision and argued that application of its rigid, bright-line rule
regarding an attorney’s conduct would lead to an unjust outcome in his
case.
In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that even if Collins’s conduct
was grossly negligent,
[N]o allegation of lawyer negligence . . . in the absence of an allegation
and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or
so forth on the lawyer’s part–can rise to the level of egregious attorney
misconduct that would entitle Petitioner to equitable tolling. Pure
professional negligence is not enough.171

Holland argued that if the Eleventh Circuit’s rule prevailed, many cases
such as his, in which “a perfect storm of circumstances resulted in the
AEDPA statute of limitations not being met,” would never “receive
meaningful, equitable consideration” by the courts.172 With the goal of
equitable treatment in mind, Holland then presented his arguments for
equitable tolling in his particular case. He noted that not only had he
written numerous letters to his attorney, but when his attorney did not
respond he asked for assistance from the Clerk of the Florida Supreme
Court and the Florida Bar Association on multiple occasions.173 Despite
Collins’s recurring failure to communicate with his client, Holland
continued to write him letters, and even outlined—and correctly
interpreted—the relevant sections of the United States Code pertaining to
Federal Habeas Corpus time limitations.174 Furthermore, every time
Holland tried to speak on his own behalf to alert the state court of his
attorney’s behavior, the “State successfully muzzled him” by arguing that
Holland could not proceed pro se while he was represented by an
attorney.175 Holland’s inability to speak on his own behalf to preserve his
federal rights, and his attorney’s absence and thus inability to speak for

167. Id. at 36 n.31 (quoting Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. at 38 (citing Gomez v. United States District Court, 503 U.S. 653, 653–54
(1992)).
169. Id. at 37.
170. Id. at 44 (quoting Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1318 (11th Cir. 2008)).
171. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008).
172. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 46.
173. Id. at 51–52.
174. Id. at 52–53.
175. Id. at 57–58.
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him, constituted “extraordinary circumstance[s]” that prevented him from
filing a timely petition.176
Holland also argued that his “diligence was far more than reasonably can
be expected of someone in his situation.”177 He noted that the “due
diligence” requirement should be “construed in light of a habeas petitioner’s
confinement in prison and any special restrictions that incarceration might
impose on such a person.”178 Holland had repeatedly alerted the Florida
Supreme Court, the State, and the Bar Association that he wanted to
preserve his federal rights and that he feared his attorney had abandoned
him.179 Despite his efforts, Holland continued, he was not able to assert his
rights because the State and the court told Holland he could not speak on
his own behalf;180 the Clerk twice referred him to the court’s webpage,
despite the fact that death row prisoners are not allowed to use
computers;181 and the Florida Bar Association ignored his first
complaint.182 When his attorney finally did contact him, his attorney was
wrong about the law and gave him incorrect advice.183 Holland nonetheless
wrote again to his attorney, providing him with the correct interpretation of
the law, despite the fact that Holland’s access to the prison law library and
writ room was substantially constrained by prison regulations.184 Holland
concluded by stating that at no point in his case did he sit on his rights. To
the contrary, he filed a pro se petition the very next day after he first learned
of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.185 The fact that he was not
successful in meeting his AEDPA deadline, he asserted, did not mean he
was not diligent.186 For all his diligence in the face of such extraordinary
circumstances, Holland concluded that he had met the threshold required
for equitable tolling.187
2. Florida
The State of Florida argued that AEDPA was not subject to equitable
tolling, and that even if it were, Holland’s case did not warrant such
treatment. It went even further by contending that the Eleventh Circuit’s
ruling was too broad because attorney misconduct, whatever the attorney’s
level of culpability, should never be a reason to grant a prisoner equitable
176. Id. at 58.
177. Id. at 59.
178. Id. at 59–60.
179. Id. at 60.
180. Id. at 57–58.
181. Id. at 12 n.12, 14.
182. Id. at 8 n.8 (noting that “[t]he Florida Bar did not initiate an investigation and did not
request that Collins respond [to the complaint against him]”).
183. Id. at 19.
184. Id. at 21–22 (noting that “the prison limits the hours that [Holland] may have access
to the law library and the law materials contained there are very limited”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
185. Id. at 55; see also Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2557 (2010).
186. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 60 n.58.
187. Id. at 27.
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tolling.188 In support for its argument, the State cited the Supreme Court’s
decision in Coleman v. Thompson.189 In Coleman, the Court held that an
attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal in a collateral proceeding
was not a reason to excuse a procedural default specifically because “no
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel exists.”190 Under agency
principles, the State continued, an attorney is his client’s agent and
therefore clients are required to bear the risk of an attorney missing a
deadline.191 Further, the State averred, the Court in Coleman specifically
rejected the “assertion that a post-conviction attorney’s error can be ‘so bad
that the lawyer ceases to be an agent of the petitioner.’”192
The State further contended that mistakes or negligence by a litigant’s
attorney are “grounded in circumstances” within the litigant’s control, and
thus do not qualify as “extraordinary circumstances” that are beyond the
petitioner’s control for equitable tolling purposes.193 Moreover, the State
framed Holland’s challenges with his attorney as nothing more than his
attorney’s “misunderstanding of the law [regarding] when the one-year
188. Brief for Respondent at 22–23, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010) (No. 095327) (arguing that “equitable tolling does not apply for attorney misconduct amounting to
ineffective assistance of counsel”). In terms of the State’s argument that AEDPA should not
be subject to equitable tolling, the State asserted that equitable tolling is inconsistent with the
text and structure of AEDPA because Congress already laid out specific instances of tolling
within the statute itself. Id. at 26–27. For the Court to extend the time beyond these
instances, the State continued, would be inconsistent with the text of the statute. Id. (noting
that “[e]ven where equitable considerations strongly support[] a nonliteral reading of the
statutory provisions regarding the time during which a claim could be asserted[,] this Court
has refrained from altering the statutory structure that Congress enacted”). The State further
asserted that application of equitable tolling would be at odds with the Congressional
purpose of AEDPA: namely “the reduction of delays and abuses in federal habeas
proceedings via the establishment of a detailed statute of limitations.” Id. at 23. Permitting
equitable tolling, the State urged, would invite “side litigation . . . over attorney misconduct
[that] would significantly lengthen the habeas process via additional hearings, appeals, and
certiorari petitions to this Court.” Id. at 30. The State also maintained that allowing delay in
the habeas process would “damage[] the states’ implementation of their criminal justice
systems and creat[e] uncertainty as to the finality of criminal judgments.” Id. at 31.
Therefore, the State concluded, AEDPA should not be subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 23.
189. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
190. Brief for Respondent, supra note 188, at 33 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 756–57).
191. Id. at 34. As discussed in Part I.B.1 supra, the only time the risk for attorney error
will be imputed to the State is when the Constitution requires the State to provide a criminal
defendant with counsel. In that situation, the State—and not the client—would be held
responsible in the event that the attorney, which the State appointed, did not provide
effective assistance of counsel to the criminal defendant client. See generally Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The Constitution, however, does not provide postconviction prisoners with the right to counsel, therefore, prisoners such as Holland must bear
the risk of attorney error on their own, as per “well-settled principles of agency law.” Brief
for Respondent, supra note 188, at 34 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754).
192. Id. (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754). Holland rejoined in his reply brief that
Coleman’s analysis had nothing to do with the equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations
period and that AEDPA did not even exist when Coleman was decided. See Petitioner’s
Reply Brief on the Merits at 9–10, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010) (No. 09-5327).
Holland argued that his case was not about a constitutional right to counsel, rather, it was
about whether he was entitled to equitable tolling under the circumstances of his late habeas
corpus filing. Id. at 10.
193. Brief for Respondent, supra note 188, at 39.
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limitations period under AEDPA began to run.”194 The State then cited
Lawrence v. Florida,195 in which the Court held that “[a]ttorney
miscalculation [of AEDPA’s limitations period] is simply not sufficient to
warrant equitable tolling.”196 “Viewed fairly,” the State concluded, “the
relationship between Holland and Collins was one in which Holland
consistently second-guessed and interfered with the professional judgment
of his counsel”197 and thus “Holland’s claim for equitable tolling reduces to
a misunderstanding about the tolling period for the federal habeas
petition.”198 Accordingly, none of Holland’s claims rise to the level of
“extraordinary attorney behavior” that could justify equitable tolling under
the Lawrence precedent.199
Although the State insisted that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision should be
affirmed, it also argued that its standard for allowing equitable tolling only
in cases of an attorney’s egregious misconduct “is unworkable in
practice.”200 The Eleventh Circuit’s rule, the State warned, creates
incentives for prisoners to falsely allege that their attorneys acted with
dishonesty as a delay tactic to prolong their limitations periods.201 Indeed,
capital litigants and their attorneys may even have “some incentive to agree
that counsel . . . [was] less than honest if the effect is to extend the time for
judgment and avoid finality.”202 The State further cautioned that the
Eleventh Circuit’s standards of “divided loyalty and mental impairment”
are similarly subjective and create the same incentive for prisoners to
characterize circumstances within their control as “extraordinary” for the
purposes of obtaining equitable tolling.203
The State then turned its attention to the due diligence prong of the
equitable tolling analysis and supported the District Court’s findings that
Holland had not acted with the requisite level of diligence under the

194. Id. at 43.
195. 549 U.S. 327 (2007).
196. Id. at 336–37.
197. Brief for Respondent, supra note 188, at 45.
198. Id. at 43. In Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Holland argued that there is a difference
between an attorney’s simple negligence in failing to file a petition and a situation in which
an attorney ignores his client’s requests or instructions. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra
note 192, at 11–14. Holland cited Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), in which the
Court held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from a client to file a notice of
appeal “acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable. . . . [F]iling a notice of appeal is
purely a ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to the defendant’s wishes.”
Id. at 477 (citations omitted). Holland thus argued that his circumstances were
distinguishable from mere attorney negligence because Holland had repeatedly instructed his
attorney to file his federal habeas petition on time. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note
192, at 13.
199. Brief for Respondent, supra note 188, at 44 (adding that “[t]his ‘garden variety’
negligence by an attorney does not provide grounds for equitable tolling”) (citing Holland v.
Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008)).
200. Id. at 46–50.
201. Id. at 46–47.
202. Id. at 47.
203. Id. at 49.
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circumstances.204 As the District Court held, when “Holland felt his
attorney was not competent, it became incumbent upon Holland to act given
the circumstances he found himself in” and that “a reasonable person in his
position would have done more to protect his interests in filing a federal
habeas petition.”205
C. The Holland Decision
In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court decided that AEDPA’s
statute of limitations was subject to equitable tolling.206 The Court also
overturned the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling that Holland’s case did not warrant
equitable intervention, as well as its bright-line rule for equitable tolling in
cases of attorney default.207 While the Court stated that the facts of
Holland’s situation “suggest that this case may well present ‘extraordinary’
circumstances,” the Court did not make a determination as to whether
Holland was entitled to equitable tolling.208 Instead, it remanded his case to
the Eleventh Circuit for further proceedings to determine whether equitable
tolling was warranted under the Court’s new guidelines.209
The Court began its analysis by holding that AEDPA is subject to
equitable tolling, reiterating its precedent that a non-jurisdictional federal
statute of limitations is subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of
equitable tolling.210 This presumption, the Court stated, was further
reinforced by the fact that habeas corpus has always been an equitable
remedy governed by equitable principles.211 The Court concluded that
although AEDPA was enacted with the purpose of eliminating delays in the
process of federal habeas review, the statute can still achieve its purpose
without undermining the basic equitable principles of habeas corpus, under
which a petition’s timeliness had historically been determined by equitable
standards.212 Accordingly, the Court concluded that AEDPA’s limitations
period is subject to equitable tolling.213
204. Id. at 45–46.
205. Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted). The State, however, did not provide any
explanation as to what actions, in its opinion, Holland could have taken that would have
fulfilled the diligence requirement.
206. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010). Justice Breyer delivered the
opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment and filed a
concurring opinion. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas
joined as to all but Part I. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2565.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2560 (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)).
211. Id. (“‘[E]quitable principles’ have traditionally ‘governed’ the substantive law of
habeas corpus’” (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008))).
212. Id. at 2562.
213. Id. As this Comment is focused on attorney default rather than the general question
of whether AEDPA’s limitations period should be subject to equitable tolling, this Comment
briefly discusses the Court’s reasoning behind its decision in this regard. For further
discussion of this issue, see id. at 2560–63. See also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 125,
at 36–45; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 188, at 22–31. See generally Bellamy, supra
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Turning to the issue of attorney default, the Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit’s ruling and remanded Holland’s case to determine whether the
factual allegations in the record actually warrant equitable tolling.214 The
Court set the stage for the equitable tolling inquiry by invoking the canons
of professional responsibility as a benchmark for evaluating whether the
attorney’s behavior rose to the level of extraordinary circumstances that
prevented Holland from filing his habeas petition on time.215 The Court
found that Collins’s failures to perform adequate legal research or
communicate with his client about crucial facts such as the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision—which triggered AEDPA’s limitations period again—
were actions that violated basic standards of professional responsibility.216
In this case, the Court concluded, Collins’s professional lapses extinguished
his client’s ability to assert his last appeal for judicial review before his
conviction and death sentence was to be carried out.217 The Court thus
found that Collins had violated fundamental principles of professional
conduct, and that Holland was seriously prejudiced by his attorney’s
failures in this regard. Having found that Holland was injured by his
attorney’s conduct, the Court then had to make a decision: It could either
strictly apply agency law, which binds clients to the acts or omissions of
their attorneys, or carve out an exception to the agency doctrine by invoking
equitable principles and granting Holland the remedy of equitable tolling.218
In the beginning of its agency analysis, the Court recognized its previous
holdings in the context of procedural default in which petitioners “must
‘bear the risk of attorney error.’”219 While the Court has historically
disposed of claims of attorney error resulting in procedural default by
applying agency law, the Court continued, equity has also played an
integral role in the Court’s jurisprudence, and it emphasized the need for
flexibility to avoid injustices that may occur when a law is strictly
applied.220 In light of both of these precedents—agency and equity—equity
carried the day in Holland’s case, and the Court held that professional
note 42, at 54 (contending that equitable tolling should be applied to AEDPA’s limitations
period in order to avoid unjust outcomes); Traum, supra note 38, at 599 (arguing that
equitable tolling is necessary to ensure prisoners are not unfairly deprived of access to
habeas relief).
214. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564–65.
215. Id. at 2562 (“In this case, the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ at issue involve an
attorney’s failure to satisfy professional standards of care.”).
216. Id. at 2565. Specifically, the Court commented that Collins’s behavior violated
ethical rules that require attorneys to perform “reasonably competent legal work, to
communicate with their clients, [and] to keep their clients informed of key developments in
their cases.” Id. at 2564.
217. Id. at 2565 (noting that his attorney’s failures extinguished “his single opportunity
for federal habeas review of the lawfulness of his imprisonment and of his death sentence”).
218. Id. at 2563 (noting that “this case asks how equity should be applied”).
219. Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752–53 (1991)). This notion is
consistent with the fundamental principles of agency law.
220. Id. (“[W]e have followed a tradition in which courts of equity have sought to ‘relieve
hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast adherence’ to more absolute
legal rules . . . .”) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
248 (1944)).
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misconduct that amounts to egregious attorney behavior can constitute an
extraordinary circumstance warranting the use of equitable tolling.221
However, the Court limited its ruling by reaffirming its longstanding rule
that an attorney’s simple negligence is not an extraordinary circumstance,
thus it does not warrant equitable tolling.222 In distinguishing negligence
from misconduct, the Court described attorneys who miscalculate the
statute of limitations deadline as examples of “garden variety claim[s] of
excusable neglect.”223 It labeled Holland’s attorney’s conduct, on the other
hand, as a case of “far more serious instances of attorney misconduct.”224
However, the Court did not specifically define misconduct, rather, it simply
held that behavior that falls into the category of attorney misconduct is “not
limited to those [circumstances] that satisfy the test the Court of Appeals
used in this case.”225
Finally, the Court turned to the issue of due diligence, and held that
Holland had acted with the requisite level of diligence to satisfy this prong
of the equitable tolling analysis.226 The standard required for equitable
tolling, the Court continued, was “reasonable diligence” and not “maximum
feasible diligence.”227 In making its determination, the Court emphasized
that Holland immediately took action when he found out his attorney had
failed to file his habeas petition on time by filing his pro se petition the next
day.228
Upon remand, the Eleventh Circuit handed Holland’s case back to the
District Court for-fact finding and further proceedings consistent with the

221. Id. In supporting its holding, the Court finally decided the circuit split by citing the
line of circuit court cases that held attorney misconduct could warrant equitable tolling. See
id. at 2563–64 (noting that “[s]everal lower courts have specifically held that unprofessional
attorney conduct may, in certain circumstances, prove ‘egregious’ and can be
‘extraordinary’”). The Court also distinguished its prior ruling in Coleman simply by stating
that “Coleman was a ‘case about federalism’” because its inquiry turned on whether federal
courts may excuse a litigant’s failure to comply with a state court’s procedural rules. Id. at
2563. The equitable tolling question in this case, the Court continued, asked only whether
federal courts may excuse a litigant’s failure to comply with federal procedural rules—an
inquiry that does not implicate federalism concerns. Id.
222. Id. at 2564. By excluding negligence from circumstances that may warrant equitable
tolling, the Court avoided any contradiction with its ruling in Lawrence, in which it held that
attorney negligence did not warrant equitable tolling in Lawrence’s case, but did not evaluate
any issues of attorney misconduct. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007).
223. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564.
224. Id.
225. Id. Here, the Court referred to the Eleventh Circuit’s test to determine where to
draw the line between attorney negligence or misconduct, which stated that “attorney
negligence that is ‘grossly negligent’ can never warrant equitable tolling absent ‘bad faith,
dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth on the lawyer’s part.” Id. at 2562–
63 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)).
226. Id. at 2565.
227. Id.
228. Id. (noting that “the very day Holland discovered that his AEDPA clock had expired
due to Collins’ failings, Holland prepared his own habeas petition pro se and promptly filed
it with the District Court”).
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Supreme Court’s judgment.229 As of the publication of this Comment,
Holland’s case is still pending in the District Court.
D. The Concurrence
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the
majority that the facts of Holland’s case suggest that his attorney’s conduct
was so far beyond ordinary negligence that equitable tolling would likely be
awarded in this case upon remand.230 Justice Alito wrote separately,
however, because he thought the majority opinion did not provide sufficient
guidance for the lower courts.231 While he acknowledged the impracticality
of attempting to anticipate and define every situation in which an attorney’s
behavior could be construed as negligence or misconduct, he set forth
“several broad principles” about the negligence/misconduct distinction to
guide the lower courts in their future cases.232 First, Justice Alito explained
that it would be impractical for courts to attempt to distinguish “ordinary”
attorney negligence from gross negligence,233 therefore, any form of
attorney negligence should never constitute equitable tolling and instead
must always be attributed to the client under agency principles.234 Since
the attorney is acting on behalf of the client in furtherance of the litigation,
he explained, the attorney’s negligence is constructively attributed to the
client.235 Therefore, he concluded, the attorney’s negligence is not a
circumstance beyond the prisoner’s control that would prevent him from
filing his habeas petition on time.236
Justice Alito argued that attorney misconduct, on the other hand, would
be grounds for equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations period because an
agent’s misconduct is not constructively attributable to the client.237 In this
aspect of his opinion, he cited the Second Circuit’s agency analysis in
stating that when an attorney’s actions are completely adverse to the client’s
interests, the attorney is not truly acting as the client’s agent and therefore
his actions are not constructively attributed to the client.238 This rule
229. See Holland v. Florida, No. 07-13366, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16058, at *1 (11th
Cir. Aug. 3, 2010) (ordering the District Court to hold an evidentiary hearing if necessary).
230. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2566 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that Holland “alleged
certain facts that go well beyond any form of attorney negligence”).
231. Id. (“Although I agree that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard, I think
that the majority does not do enough to explain the right standard.”).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2567 (arguing that the question of equitable tolling should not “turn on the
highly artificial distinction between gross and ordinary negligence”).
234. Id. at 2566 (noting that the Court’s prior cases of procedural default make the law
“abundantly clear that attorney negligence is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting
equitable tolling”).
235. Id. at 2566–67 (explaining that “[a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence is not ‘cause’
[for excusing a procedural default] because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting,
or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner ‘must bear the risk of
attorney error’” (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991))).
236. Id. at 2567.
237. Id. at 2568.
238. Id. (“[W]hen an ‘agent acts in a manner completely adverse to the principal’s
interests,’ the ‘principal is not charged with [the] agent’s misdeeds.’” (alteration in original)
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separating attorney negligence from misconduct, Alito reasoned, was in full
conformity with agency law. Further, he remarked, “[c]ommon sense
dictates that a litigant cannot be held constructively responsible for the
conduct of an attorney who is not operating as his agent in any meaningful
sense of that word.”239 If Holland’s allegations of his attorney’s conduct
prove to be true, Justice Alito concluded, they would establish the
extraordinary circumstances beyond his control that warrant equitable
tolling.240
E. The Dissent
Justices Scalia and Thomas did not agree with either aspect of the
majority’s ruling. The dissent stated its opinion that AEDPA’s limitations
period should not be subject to equitable tolling, and Holland would not be
eligible for such a remedy even if it were.241 In the plain language of the
statute, the dissent emphasized, Congress had enumerated specific events
that toll the limitations period, leaving no room for the Court to add
exceptions, such as equitable tolling, as it sees fit.242
The dissent then turned to the facts of Holland’s case and firmly adhered
to the principles of agency law in its determination that Holland’s
circumstances did not warrant equitable tolling.243 The dissent explained
that Congress could have included errors made by state-appointed habeas
counsel as a statutory basis for tolling the limitations period, but it did
not.244 Therefore, the dissent concluded, “when a state habeas petitioner’s
appeal is filed too late because of attorney error, the petitioner is out of
luck.”245
For support, the dissent pointed to the Court’s recent decisions in
Coleman and Lawrence. Coleman, the dissent stated, was not a case about
federalism as the majority proclaimed.246 Instead, Coleman merely
reinforced the principle that because there is no Sixth Amendment right to
the effective assistance of counsel in habeas proceedings, “the rule holding
[the petitioner] responsible for his attorney’s acts applies with full force” in
this case.247 The dissent also reasoned that Lawrence was squarely on point
with the facts of Holland’s case.248 Collins, the dissent proceeded, most
(quoting Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J.,
concurring))).
239. Id. (emphasizing that petitioners should not be held accountable for an attorney’s
misconduct especially when “the litigant’s reasonable efforts to terminate the attorney’s
representation have been thwarted by forces wholly beyond the petitioner’s control”).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2569 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 2570. For further discussion of the dissent’s interpretation of AEDPA’s
limitations period, which Justice Thomas did not join, see id. at 2569–71.
243. Id. at 2571 (“Because the attorney is the litigant’s agent, the attorney’s acts (or
failures to act) within the scope of the representation are treated as those of his client . . . .”).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2571 n.4.
247. Id. at 2571 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752–54 (1991)).
248. Id. at 2572.
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likely made the exact mistake that the attorney in Lawrence made by
assuming incorrectly that a pending petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court seeking review of the state court’s denial of post-conviction relief
would toll AEDPA’s timing provisions under § 2244(d)(2).249 Although
this mistake would account for Collins’s conduct, the dissent persisted, it
would be insufficient to warrant equitable tolling under Lawrence.250
Justice Scalia then addressed the due diligence standard of the equitable
tolling analysis. In the dissent’s opinion, nothing Collins did actually
prevented Holland from filing his habeas petition on time.251 Collins’s
repeated failures to respond to Holland’s requests for information, Justice
Scalia continued, should have alerted Holland that “Collins had fallen
asleep at the switch.”252 Accordingly, the dissent admonished, Holland
could have filed a “‘protective’ federal habeas application” and asked the
federal court to stay its proceedings until the state courts finished their
review.253 He could have also checked the prison writ room for his court
records on a more regular basis.254 In short, the dissent argued that Holland
could have taken many other actions to file his habeas petition on time and
therefore was not convinced that Holland had acted with the requisite
diligence required for equitable tolling.255
Finally, the dissent expressed concern over the precedential and policy
ramifications of the majority’s opinion. First, the dissent stated that the
majority’s holding created a disincentive for states to provide postconviction counsel at all, as “[i]t would be utterly perverse . . . to penalize
the State for providing habeas petitioners with representation, when the

249. Id. The defaulting attorney in Lawrence had made this exact mistake in calculating
AEDPA’s limitations period. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 330–36 (2007). In
Lawrence, the Court first noted that the text of AEDPA’s limitations period provided for
statutory tolling only while state courts reviewed a habeas petition. Id. at 332. The Supreme
Court, however, “is not a part of a State’s post-conviction procedures” and therefore section
2244(d)(2) of AEDPA’s limitations period is not tolled during the pendency of a petition for
certiorari. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While Collins did not seem to be aware of
the rule in Lawrence, Holland apparently was, and brought this issue to Collins’s attention in
one of the many letters he wrote to his attorney. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557 (“Dear Mr.
Bradley M. Collins: . . . . It’s my understanding that the AEDPA time limitations is not
tolled during discretionary appellate reviews, such as certiorari applications resulting from
denial of state post conviction proceedings.”).
250. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 2573. This aspect of the dissent’s analysis is on par with the Seventh Circuit,
which before Holland had consistently held that diligent prisoners could always file their
own pro se petitions in federal court if they were worried that their attorneys were going to
miss the deadline. See, e.g., Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
an attorney’s misconduct in abandoning the prisoner’s case for over a year did not actually
prevent the prisoner from filing a timely petition); Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968
(7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that attorney misconduct does not prevent a prisoner from filing
his own pro se habeas petition because “petitioners bear ultimate responsibility for their
filings, even if that means preparing duplicative petitions”).
252. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 2576.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 2575.
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State could avoid equitable tolling by providing none at all.”256 Second, the
dissent lamented, the majority failed to adequately explain the errors in the
Eleventh Circuit’s test and at the same time offered the lower courts little
guidance as to what test they should actually use.257
III. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE HOLLAND DECISION
In Holland, the Supreme Court finally determined that AEDPA’s statute
of limitations is subject to equitable tolling, and that in some circumstances,
an attorney’s failure to file a habeas corpus petition on behalf of a prisoner
may warrant the use of equitable tolling to allow the prisoner’s petition to
be heard on the merits. Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Holland
is relatively recent, its long-term impact is hard to determine at this point.
However, many commentators would likely applaud the first part of the
Court’s decision that AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to equitable
tolling.258 The focus of this Comment, however, is directed toward the
second part of the Court’s ruling: that an attorney’s negligence will never
constitute such “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the use of equitable
tolling, but that some situations involving attorney misconduct may.259
While the Court’s decision to strike down the Eleventh Circuit’s overly
narrow equitable tolling standard is commendable, this Comment argues
that the Court incorrectly applied agency law to the context of postconviction habeas corpus representation and therefore did not go far enough
to protect a prisoner’s access to his final appeal in the criminal justice
system: the writ of habeas corpus.
A. The New Rule for Equitable Tolling After Holland: How the
Negligence/Misconduct Standard is Unworkable in Practice
As discussed above, the Court affirmed the equitable tolling rule it had
previously referred to in Lawrence, which states that a prisoner may be
granted equitable tolling if he can show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his
way’ and prevented timely filing.”260 This section of the Comment takes a

256. Id. at 2571 n.5.
257. Id. at 2574. Justice Scalia then proceeded to attack the majority’s reliance on
attorney ethics rules in his usual rhetorical fashion: “The only thing the Court offers that
approaches substantive instruction is its implicit approval of ‘fundamental canons of
professional responsibility,’ articulated by an ad hoc group of legal-ethicist amici consisting
mainly of professors of that least analytically rigorous and hence most subjective of lawschool subjects, legal ethics.” Id. at 2575.
258. See, e.g., Bellamy, supra note 42, at 54 (supporting the use of equitable tolling in
AEDPA litigation in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice); Stevenson, supra note 24, at
360 (arguing that the denial of habeas corpus review on procedural grounds, such as the
failure to file before the limitations period, is unfair); Traum, supra note 38, at 599
(“[E]quitable tolling is essential to ensuring that the Court, in applying Section 2244(d)
[AEDPA’s limitations period], does not unfairly deprive prisoners of access to the writ.”).
259. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564.
260. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); see also supra
Part I.B.
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closer look at the Court’s rule, specifically the range of attorney behaviors
that constitute “extraordinary circumstances” and the actions the prisoner
must take to meet the “due diligence” threshold.
1. Extraordinary Circumstances: Why are Attorneys Ordinarily Negligent?
As the Court noted in Holland, and the circuit courts of appeals found in
similar cases of attorney default in AEDPA litigation, the extraordinary
circumstances aspect of the equitable tolling rule requires courts to
scrutinize the attorney’s conduct in failing to file a timely habeas petition
on behalf of his client.261 Specifically, the Court held that simple attorney
negligence does not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,”262 but that in
some situations, professional misconduct that amounts to egregious attorney
behavior does.263 Holland is not the first time that the Supreme Court has
held that attorney negligence does not warrant equitable relief for the
injured client, and has alluded several times to the notion that attorney
negligence seems to be an ordinary occurrence within the legal
profession.264
The Court’s ruling that attorney negligence is not an “extraordinary
circumstance” is unsettling for many reasons. Why does the Supreme
Court seem to be complacent with the notion that attorney negligence is an
ordinary occurrence within the legal profession? The legal profession is
self regulated and has established attorney disciplinary mechanisms
available to deter unprofessional conduct,265 but the Court did not once
refer to these mechanisms or offer the lower courts any guidance as to how
to craft rules that will improve the baseline standard of attorney behavior.
Substandard criminal defense representation, at any stage of the litigation,
undermines the adversarial process266 and engenders a negative public
perception of the criminal justice system.267 Aside from the societal costs,
261. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562.
262. Id. at 2564 (noting that an attorney’s “‘garden variety claim of excusable
neglect’ . . . does not warrant equitable tolling” (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990))).
263. Id. at 2563 (noting that “professional misconduct that . . . amount[s] to egregious
behavior [may] create an extraordinary circumstance that warrants equitable tolling”).
264. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) (declining to allow
equitable tolling for attorney mistake because it would then “essentially equitably toll
limitations periods for every person whose attorney missed a deadline”); Irwin, 498 U.S. at
96 (describing an attorney’s failure to submit a timely employment discrimination claim as a
“garden variety claim” of an attorney’s excusable neglect); see also Modrowski v. Mote, 322
F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “attorney negligence is not extraordinary”).
265. Every jurisdiction maintains a disciplinary system that regulates lawyers according
to codified ethical rules, and a license to practice law is conditioned upon compliance with
the jurisdiction’s standards of professional conduct. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at
1615–16.
266. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that ineffective
criminal defense representation undermines the “proper functioning of the adversarial
process”).
267. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at 1628 (lamenting that “[p]oor provision of
criminal defense services is a grievous injury not only for clients but for the legal profession
and the public”); see also Stevenson, supra note 24, at 342 (“If the administration of
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an ABA report commented that to the wrongfully convicted, “the cost of
inadequate defense representation is reflected in countless wasted years
spent in prison, the deprivation of cherished rights . . . and quite possibly
the loss of life.”268 When an attorney miscalculates his client’s AEDPA
deadline or engages in similar negligent conduct, the prisoner’s right to
habeas corpus is extinguished, a situation which may engender the very
consequences that the ABA predicts. Thus, the Court has a strong policy
incentive to deter attorney negligence in this context, and it is unfortunate
for the wrongfully convicted prisoner—not to mention the ideals of fairness
and justice—that the Court chose not to do so in its opinion in Holland.
Furthermore, the Court’s distinction between negligence and misconduct
seems to be unworkable in practice because it may lead to disparate results
for prisoners who have pending cases in the circuit courts of appeals.
While the Court stated definitively that ordinary attorney negligence does
not warrant equitable tolling, it did not actually articulate a definable
standard as to what types of attorney behavior would rise to the level of
extraordinary circumstances. For example, the Court overruled the
Eleventh Circuit’s test, which required a prisoner to offer “proof of bad
faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth” in order to
be granted equitable tolling after his attorney missed the AEDPA
deadline.269 However, the Court did not offer a test of its own, but instead
merely stated, “we hold that such [extraordinary] circumstances are not
limited to those that satisfy the test the Court of Appeals used in this
case.”270 In his dissent, Justice Scalia emphasized this point when he stated
that “the Court offers almost no clue about what test [the Eleventh Circuit]
should have applied”271 and Justice Alito stated that “Although I agree that
the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard, I think that the majority
does not do enough to explain the right standard.” 272
Commendably, the Court did at least suggest that lower courts use the
canons of professional responsibility as a benchmark for determining
whether the attorney’s behavior amounted to misconduct.273 Indeed, the

criminal justice is perceived to be unfair, corrupt, biased, and error-plagued, it is not seen as
a corrective or necessary component of public safety.”).
268. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 4. The Third Circuit’s jurisprudence
in AEDPA litigation reflected similar sentiments prior to Holland by affording considerable
weight to the fact that there may be a death sentence on the line when deciding whether to
bind a habeas petitioner by his attorney’s error. See Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2001) (recognizing that in capital cases, “the consequences of error are terminal, and we
therefore pay particular attention to whether principles of ‘equity would make the rigid
application of a limitation period unfair’”) (quoting Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145
F.3d 616, 618 (1998)).
269. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (2008) (per curiam).
270. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010).
271. Id. at 2574 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 2566 (Alito, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 2564–65 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia also acknowledged this point in his
dissent, stating that “[t]he only thing the Court offers that approaches substantive instruction
is its implicit approval of ‘fundamental canons of professional responsibility.’” Id. at 2574
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court remarked that in Holland’s case, “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’
at issue involve an attorney’s failure to satisfy professional standards of
care.”274 The Court then cited an attorney’s duties to, among other things,
“communicate with their clients” and “perform reasonably competent legal
work.”275 Although such standards of professional conduct are important,
requiring the lower courts to use these standards to bisect the line between
negligence and misconduct—which determines whether a prisoner’s habeas
claim will be heard on the merits or not—may still very likely lead to
disparate conclusions by the lower courts.
For example, before Holland the Third and Seventh Circuits reached
opposite conclusions in two cases that presented a similar set of facts:
Modrowski v. Mote276 and Nara v. Frank.277 The attorneys in each case
failed to meet AEDPA’s limitations deadline, failed to effectively
communicate with their clients, and performed almost no legal work on
their clients’ respective habeas petitions during the year in which the
limitations period lapsed.278 Although both attorneys displayed similar
behavior in effectively abandoning their clients, the Third Circuit found that
this behavior amounted to attorney misconduct,279 while the Seventh
Circuit held that it was merely attorney negligence.280 Nara, the prisoner in
the Third Circuit, was awarded equitable tolling and had his habeas petition
heard on the merits,281 while the unlucky prisoner in the Seventh Circuit,
Modrowski, was not.282 These results have real consequences. When all
was said and done, Nara’s habeas corpus petition was ultimately granted.
After the Third Circuit heard his claims on the merits, it found that he had
in fact been wrongfully convicted.283 What might have come of
Modrowski’s habeas claims, no one will ever know, since his attorney filed
the petition one day late.

274. Id. at 2562 (majority opinion).
275. Id. at 2564. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003) (requiring a
lawyer to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”); Id. R.
1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter”).
276. 322 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2003).
277. 264 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2001).
278. See Modrowski, 322 F.3d at 966. In Modrowski, the Seventh Circuit noted that in
addition to the attorney filing the habeas petition one day late, “[t]he petition was unsigned,
missing the filing fee and exhibits, and had blank paragraphs where many of Modrowski’s
constitutional claims should have been.” Id. at 966. In Nara, the Third Circuit noted that the
prisoner’s allegations that his attorney had “effectively abandoned” him halfway through the
litigation when she failed to move his case forward, if found to be true in a factual hearing
upon remand, would be enough for equitable tolling. Nara, 264 F.3d at 320.
279. Nara, 264 F.3d at 320.
280. Modrowski, 322 F.3d at 966 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of Modrowski’s
petition as untimely because attorney negligence does not warrant equitable tolling).
281. Upon remand, the Magistrate Judge found that equitable tolling should apply under
Nara’s circumstances. Nara v. Frank, Civil Action No. 99-5, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6508, at
*1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2004), aff’d, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
282. Modrowski, 322 F.3d at 968.
283. Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s order
directing the Commonwealth to release Nara if it did not retry him within 120 days).
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In similar fashion, when courts seek to apply the rules of professional
responsibility, conduct that meets the threshold of “reasonably competent
legal work” in one circuit may not pass muster in another.284 Accordingly,
the Court’s rule requiring lower courts to distinguish between negligence
and misconduct may lead to very inequitable results.
This approach to equitable tolling also creates an ironic result in that
prisoners will actually fare better the worse their attorney’s conduct
becomes. It is only if his attorney crosses the line to misconduct that the
prisoner has a chance to receive equitable tolling in the case of attorney
default.285 Equitable tolling is never granted for “ordinary” attorney
negligence;286 therefore, if the attorney commits misconduct when filing the
petition past AEDPA’s deadline, he is actually putting his client in a better
position for equitable tolling than if he were merely negligent in missing the
deadline.287 Accordingly, this result may create the perverse incentive for
attorneys who are confused about AEDPA’s complex procedural
requirements to abandon their clients’ cases, rather than attempt to better
understand the law and risk the chance of filing the petitions late. While it
is difficult to believe that attorneys would deliberately commit misconduct
in an effort to better serve their clients, the perverse incentive that this rule
conceivably engenders certainly does not serve to improve the professional
standards of conduct in the legal profession.
2. Due Diligence: The Due Diligence Standard in the Context of Prison
The Court also addressed the actions Albert Holland took in an effort to
contact his attorney, obtain information about his case, and ultimately file
his own pro se habeas petition when he realized his attorney had missed the
deadline. While the Court did establish that the standard for due diligence
is “reasonable diligence” and not “maximum feasible diligence,”288 it left
open the question that the courts of appeals had debated,289 namely,
whether the specific circumstances of the prisoner’s confinement should be
factored into the due diligence analysis.290 While the Court noted
Holland’s repeated attempts to contact his attorney, the courts, and the
Florida State Bar Association, it made no reference to the fact that Holland
was doing all of this from inside the walls of prison,291 even though
284. That said, one could question how an attorney’s failure to file a petition on time and
thereby extinguishing a client’s rights to federal habeas corpus review could ever be
“reasonably competent” legal representation in any sense of the term.
285. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
287. See supra Part I.A.2.
288. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
289. See supra Part I.B.2.
290. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565. While the Court addressed the issue of Holland’s due
diligence, it did not state whether it was considering the circumstances of his imprisonment
into its analysis.
291. Id. Justice Alito did not address the due diligence part of the equitable tolling test in
his concurring opinion. Id. at 2565–68 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Scalia did not think
that Holland had shown the requisite standard at all. Id. at 2576 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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Holland urged the Court to take his imprisonment into account in his brief
on the merits.292
Nonetheless, in overturning the District Court’s determination that
Holland did not act with the requisite diligence, the Court reviewed the
actions Holland took in attempting to obtain information about his case
when his attorney stopped communicating with him.293 Holland’s actions,
however, were met with insurmountable barriers. For example, the Clerk
told Holland, an indigent prisoner, that he would have to pay seventy-seven
dollars to obtain copies of his court records.294 As the ABA has found,
most habeas corpus petitioners are indigent and cannot afford to pay court
fees,295 an issue which greatly impacts a prisoner’s ability to show due
diligence in obtaining information about his case. If a prisoner cannot
obtain information about a state court’s denial of his appeal, he will not be
able to determine when his AEDPA clock begins running.296 Besides the
difficulties in obtaining information about the prisoner’s specific case, often
times prisoners have a hard time finding information about the law and
AEDPA’s statute of limitations in the first place. For example, prison
libraries are often deficient and prisoners’ access to these libraries can be
severely restricted.297 One court has even justified the use of equitable
tolling on this basis, noting that even a diligent prisoner’s inability to learn
about AEDPA due to prison law library deficiencies constituted
extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from filing on time.298

(stating that Holland could have pursued other reasonable measures, such as seeking
permission to proceed pro se and formally discharging his attorney, instead of requesting that
his attorney be replaced, in order to free himself from his attorney’s inadequate
representation). Justice Alito, however, noted in his concurring opinion that even Holland’s
efforts to proceed pro se “were successfully opposed by the State on the perverse ground that
the petitioner failed to act through appointed counsel.” Id. at 2568 (Alito, J., concurring).
292. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 59–60 (arguing that the due diligence
requirement should be “construed in light of a habeas petitioner’s confinement in prison and
any special restrictions that incarceration might impose on such a person”).
293. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565 (noting that “Holland not only wrote his attorney
numerous letters seeking crucial information and providing direction; he also repeatedly
contacted the state courts [and] their clerks . . .”).
294. See supra text accompanying note 126.
295. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense
Organizations as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 902 (1996)
(stating that habeas petitioners such as “[c]apital inmates almost uniformly are indigent”)
(internal citations omitted); Stevenson, supra note 24, at 349 (describing that most habeas
prisoners have “virtually no resources” with which to litigate in habeas proceedings).
296. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564 (noting that Holland’s attorney had “failed to inform
Holland in a timely manner about the crucial fact that the Florida Supreme Court had
decided his case”).
297. See Mello & Duffy, supra note 35, at 484 (noting that “many condemned inmates
are prohibited from gaining physical access to the prison law library, which itself is often
inadequate”). Even the Fifth Circuit once explained that prisoners cannot use law libraries
adequately without the aid of trained law librarians or paralegals. See Cruz v. Hauck, 627
F.2d 710, 720–21 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that when determining if a prisoner has meaningful
access to law libraries, “[i]t is not enough simply to say the books are there”).
298. See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that equitable
tolling would be warranted when deficiencies in a prison library prevented a diligent pro se
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Scholars and jurists have also argued that a habeas petitioner’s limited
ability to communicate with the outside world is a barrier to his ability to
diligently request information from, or monitor the conduct of, his
defaulting attorney.299 For example, the petitioners in both Holland and
Lawrence had no regular access to phones and were not permitted to use the
Internet.300 Contacting a defaulting attorney while in prison is difficult, and
thus courts should take the context of imprisonment into account when
determining whether the prisoner was diligent.
B. Rationale: Why Agency Law Principles are Unworkable in the
Post-Conviction Context
Both the majority opinion and the concurrence relied upon agency law
principles to reach the conclusion that Holland should given equitable
tolling upon remand if the lower court finds that his allegations of his
attorney’s conduct are true.301 However, a deeper analysis reveals that
agency law’s foundational principles are unworkable in the post-conviction
context. This section of the Comment discusses the Court’s and Justice
Alito’s application of agency law in Holland, and evaluates the
effectiveness of the agency doctrine in achieving just outcomes for
prisoners whose attorneys fail to meet AEDPA’s statute of limitations
deadline.
As the Restatement of Agency makes clear, one of the founding
principles of agency law is that the principal has the ability to control the
agent.302 Accordingly, the attribution of the lawyer’s conduct to the client
is appropriate because clients are the only parties that can direct and oversee

prisoner from learning about the limitations period). Holland also argued this point in his
brief. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 21–22.
299. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 17–18 (3d ed. 2002). See also
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 209 (2005) (describing the increasing use of “Supermax”
prisons as a form of incarceration that is extremely isolated and stating, “Opportunities for
visitation are rare and are always conducted through glass walls. Inmates are deprived of
almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact”).
300. See Brief for Petitioner at 11 n.25, Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) (No.
05-8820) (describing death row prisoner’s lack of access to a computer). Cf. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 125, at 2 n.1 (describing a habeas petitioner’s difficulties in contacting
his attorney about the status of his case because death row inmates do not have access to
computers).
301. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564–65 (referencing the Restatement of Agency); Id. at
2566–68 (Alito, J., concurring).
302. As the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY explains, “[t]he agent shall act on the principal’s
behalf and subject to the principal’s control.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01
(2006). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. b
(2000) (explaining that the attribution of an attorney’s conduct to the client is appropriate
because clients—as the parties involved in the case being litigated—are the only actors that
can control the lawyer’s actions in the matter at hand); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 62 (2005). Before Holland, the Seventh Circuit
applied this premise of agency law in its jurisprudence. For example, the Seventh Circuit
once stated that, “‘petitioners, whether in prison or not, must vigilantly oversee the actions of
their attorneys.’” Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Johnson v.
McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2001)).
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their attorneys’ actions.303 Justice Alito echoed this reasoning in his
concurrence, when he stated that ordinary attorney negligence is not a
circumstance beyond the litigant’s control, therefore, it does not warrant
equitable tolling.304 Yet in habeas corpus litigation, the Court and Justice
Alito fail to consider that the clients in these agency relationships are
incarcerated.305 Therefore, scholars have raised serious questions as to
whether these clients can actually exercise supervisory control over their
attorneys. The first concern is that prisons have traditionally been built in
remote places with highly restrictive visitor and mail policies.306
Consequently, the simple fact that a habeas petitioner has limited ability to
communicate with the outside world is a barrier to his ability to supervise
his attorney.307 Second, because the majority of prisoners filing habeas
corpus petitions receive appointed counsel, they are much less likely than a
paying client to influence which tasks and priorities the lawyer will
perform.308
A second, and perhaps more significant flaw in the agency analysis in the
post-conviction context, is Justice Alito’s discussion of a prisoner’s ability
to respond to an attorney’s negligence versus an attorney’s misconduct. In
his concurrence, Justice Alito explained that a lawyer’s negligence is within
the prisoner’s control,309 while a lawyer’s misconduct is not.310 And any
circumstances that are within a prisoner’s control—such as an attorney’s
gross negligence—cannot by definition be extraordinary circumstances that
prevented a prisoner from filing his habeas petition.311 While Justice
Alito’s distinction regarding a client’s ability to control his attorney’s
303. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. b (2000).
304. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining “the principal
rationale for disallowing equitable tolling based on ordinary attorney miscalculation is that
the error of an attorney is constructively attributable to the client and thus is not a
circumstance beyond the litigant’s control”) (emphasis added).
305. See Hearings on S. 2216, supra note 35, at 198 (statement of Phylis Skloot
Bamberger on behalf of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association) (explaining that
“virtually all habeas petitioners are prisoners”).
306. See MUSHLIN, supra note 299, at 17–18.
307. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text.
308. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means, by selecting a lawyer and
paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation
than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in
turn, has limited time and resources to devote to a given case.”); see also Green, supra note
27, at 1176.
309. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring).
310. Id. at 2568 (explaining that Holland’s allegations of his attorney’s misconduct would
“suffice to establish extraordinary circumstances beyond his control”) (emphasis added).
311. See id. at 2567 (stating that an attorney’s gross negligence does not establish an
extraordinary circumstance); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007)
(holding that attorney miscalculation of AEDPA’s deadline does not warrant equitable
tolling). Even before Holland, many of the circuit courts adopted similar reasoning. See,
e.g., Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that attorney error
does not create the extraordinary circumstances equitable tolling requires); Harris v.
Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[A] mistake by a party’s counsel in
interpreting a statute of limitations does not present the extraordinary circumstance beyond
the party’s control where equity should step in . . . .”).
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actions may very well be a good standard for civil litigation between private
litigants, his rationale is not practical in the post-conviction, AEDPA
litigation context.
It is difficult to understand how an incarcerated client, who most likely
has little if any access to phones, computers, or Internet, and has absolutely
no ability to show up at his attorney’s office for an in-person visit, could
possibly have any more control over his attorney’s negligent behavior than
he would over his attorney’s misconduct. Putting Justice Alito’s examples
of attorney negligence to the test illustrates this point. For example, Justice
Alito identified examples of attorney negligence as instances in which an
attorney miscalculates the filing deadline, fails to do the appropriate
research to determine the deadline, mails the petition to the wrong address,
or simply forgets about the deadline altogether.312 How can a prisoner
possibly be required to ensure that his attorney does not make these simple
mistakes? As the particular facts of Holland’s case prove, even when a
prisoner is able to successfully research AEDPA’s law, determine his
correct filing deadline under the law, and present his attorney with this
information, the prisoner nonetheless cannot ultimately control his
attorney’s failure to correctly comprehend AEDPA’s limitations
requirement.313
Moreover, Justice Alito stated that he would not allow equitable tolling if
the prisoner’s attorney was negligent in mailing a client’s habeas petition to
the wrong address.314 How could a client, who is confined inside a
penitentiary, be expected to make sure his attorney does not mistakenly
write an incorrect address on the envelope when submitting his federal
habeas corpus petition? If a client is expected to ensure the attorney is
performing adequate legal research, double-check the attorney’s
mathematical calculations of AEDPA’s complex tolling requirements, and
review the address labels on mailing envelopes, one might inquire as to the
point of having an attorney in the first place. For these reasons,
incarcerated clients cannot reasonably be expected to supervise their
attorneys in the manner that the agency relationship assumes.315

312. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring). In reference to these specific
examples of attorney default, Justice Alito specifically emphasized that “the mere fact that a
missed deadline involves ‘gross negligence’ on the part of counsel does not by itself
establish an extraordinary circumstance.” Id.
313. Id. at 2564 (majority opinion) (noting that “Collins apparently did not do the
research necessary to find out the proper filing date, despite Holland’s letters that went so far
as to identify the applicable legal rules”). See also Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968
(7th Cir. 2003) (“Even if a prisoner diligently checks an attorney’s references and
disciplinary records, he still cannot prevent the attorney from bungling his case.
Nonetheless, we hold the prisoner responsible for his attorney’s bungling.”) (emphasis
added).
314. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring).
315. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at 1620 (demonstrating that clients have little or
no ability to monitor criminal defense attorneys); Green, supra note 27, at 1170 (explaining
that many criminal defense attorneys do not keep clients reasonably informed or comply
with clients’ requests for information).

1472

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

To be sure, many of the above mentioned examples of attorney
negligence do not only affect prisoners, but also clients in civil cases who
are not incarcerated.316 Although non-incarcerated clients in civil cases
certainly have a greater ability to call, visit, and otherwise supervise their
attorneys than prisoners do, such clients are not necessarily standing over
their attorney’s shoulders to ensure that the attorney does not mail a petition
to the wrong address.317 However, there are crucial differences in the
application of agency principles in these two contexts. First, the stakes are
much higher in criminal cases than in civil cases—especially when an
imminent execution is on the line—and second, civil clients have remedies
available to them in the case of an attorney’s negligence that convicted
prisoners do not.318 The agency relationship assumes that clients may
recover monetary damages from injuries they sustain because of their
attorneys’ actions by way of legal malpractice lawsuits.319 But a prisoner
serving a life sentence or sitting on death row is not going to be
compensated for his injury—an unjust incarceration or possibly an
execution—by a monetary damages award. Moreover, due to the
complicated causation requirements involved in criminal legal malpractice
lawsuits, commentators and practitioners have found that it is virtually
impossible for a prisoner to obtain his desired relief, such as a fair trial or
Furthermore, most habeas
exoneration, through such actions.320
petitioners—as convicted prisoners—cannot even invoke the remedies of

316. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 91 (1990) (discussing an
attorney’s failure to timely file a client’s civil discrimination complaint against the Veteran’s
Administration before the statute of limitations had run).
317. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2567 (Alito, J., concurring).
318. In civil legal malpractice actions, for example, a former client may sue the defendant
attorney in tort or contract and must prove that the attorney either violated a duty of care or
breached another fiduciary duty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d
(2006); see also GILLERS, supra note 302, at 63. In criminal malpractice suits, however, the
great majority of courts nationwide require the former client to prove his actual innocence or
obtain exoneration before he can sue his defense attorney for malpractice. See RONALD E.
MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 3 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 27:13 (2010). Due to the
procedural hurdles that guard the door to criminal malpractice actions, scholars and
commentators have demonstrated that this remedy is largely unavailable to clients who may
have been harmed by negligent representation. Id. at § 27:2 (noting that statistics compiled
by the American Bar Association’s National Legal Malpractice Data Center show that claims
against “criminal law practitioners account only for a small percentage of all [malpractice]
claims”); Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A
System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 40; Green, supra note 27, at 1195 (“It [is]
almost impossible for aggrieved criminal defendants to prevail in a malpractice action,
assuming they could find a lawyer to take their cases, because of doctrinal barriers.”).
Moreover, in some jurisdictions public defenders are given absolute immunity from
malpractice liability under state law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 53 cmt. d (2000); see also GILLERS, supra note 302, at 649.
319. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d (2006).
320. See Meredith J. Duncan, Criminal Malpractice: A Lawyer’s Holiday, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1265–70 (2003). The requirement to prove actual innocence or obtain post-conviction
relief is needed for the defendant to prove the causation element of a malpractice tort claim,
that “but for his counsel’s negligence, he would have been acquitted of the offense.” Id. at
1279.
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the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.321
Because none of the remedies and procedures available to clients in a
typical agency relationship apply to convicted prisoners, strict agency
principles are not fairly applied in this context. From a prisoner’s
perspective, the Court’s line-drawing between attorney negligence and
misconduct will only result in gross inequities.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO CONTINUING PROBLEMS
This Comment proposes to abrogate the Court’s negligence/misconduct
rule, and instead offers a rule as follows: in the absence of any evidence
that a defendant was responsible for the attorney’s default, courts should
allow equitable tolling for the prisoner while directly sanctioning the
attorney. This solution will uphold the fairness objectives of the writ of
habeas corpus and is more effective in preventing attorney default than
precluding prisoner’s habeas petitions as untimely.
A. Putting the “Equity” Back into Equitable Tolling
The United States Supreme Court has held that in a criminal trial, the
right to the effective assistance of counsel is one of the fundamental values
of our democratic society.322 However, in an address to the American Bar
Association, Justice Kennedy once lamented, “When someone has been
judged guilty . . . the legal profession seems to lose all interest . . . . When
the door is locked against the prisoner, we do not think about what is behind
it.”323
The need for a wrongfully convicted prisoners to have access to postconviction relief is magnified by the dramatic increase in the number of
prisoners across the country.324 This increasing prison population is in turn
overburdening indigent defense systems, resulting in a greater likelihood of
reversible error during criminal trials.325 Therefore, there is additional need
for safeguarding the writ of habeas corpus to ensure that convictions are
fair.326 Habeas petitioners are often unable to navigate the habeas process
on their own, thus as a practical matter they are dependent on attorneys.327
The post-conviction litigation system also functions more efficiently when
attorneys participate.328 Thus, the State and the courts should be
encouraging the use of attorneys in habeas litigation.
However, courts should only encourage petitioners to entrust their
cases—and in many situations their life and liberty—to an attorney if the
321. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
322. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–86 (1984).
323. Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_08-09-03.html.
324. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
327. See supra Part I.A.1.
328. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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court can ensure the attorney-client relationship will treat the prisoner
fairly. As discussed above, the fundamental principles that maintain
fairness in the agency relationship are generally inapplicable to habeas
petitioners.329 Nor does the prisoner in the post-conviction context have an
ineffective assistance of counsel remedy.330 As a result, there are no
statutory or doctrinal protections for prisoners who suffer from an
attorney’s default in this post-conviction context. In order to uphold the
writ of habeas corpus’s purpose of maintaining fairness to prisoners in the
criminal justice system, the courts should allow equitable tolling for
attorney default in the absence of any evidence that a defendant was
responsible for the attorney’s failure to file a timely habeas petition.
Under this proposed rule, the Court’s requirement that the prisoner prove
he acted with due diligence331 is still relevant. However, it is extremely
difficult for an incarcerated prisoner in a remote penitentiary to show due
diligence by attempting to supervise or control his attorney before the
attorney misses the deadline.332 In order to produce a more just outcome,
courts should evaluate whether the prisoner acted with diligence after the
attorney default, from the point at which the prisoner actually becomes
aware of the attorney’s failure. Since equitable tolling is an equitable
remedy, the court has discretion to change the way in which it is applied.333
For example, the court could inquire into whether the prisoner was diligent
in petitioning for equitable tolling after the prisoner has discovered or
should have discovered the attorney default (i.e., did the prisoner wait five
years after his attorney defaulted to request equitable tolling?). By applying
the due diligence requirement in this way, the criminal justice system will
actually give prisoners a standard they can meet. In fact, at least two of the
circuit courts of appeals have already implemented the due diligence
requirement in this manner—after the point at which the litigant became
aware of the lawyer’s procedural default.334

329. See supra Part III.B.
330. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756–57 (1991).
331. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007).
332. See supra Part III.A.2.
333. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
334. See Dang v. Sisto, No. 08-16970, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16377, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug.
5, 2010) (mem.) (declining to apply equitable tolling to AEPDA’s limitations period in a
case of attorney default because the prisoner “did not carry his burden of showing that he
was diligent during the period after he had his case file in hand”) (emphasis added); see also
Pafe v. Holder, No. 09-3466, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17013, at *6 (8th Cir. Aug. 11, 2010).
In Pafe, the court referred to Holland’s example that “the very day that Holland discovered
that his AEDPA clock had expired due to [his attorney’s] failings, Holland prepared his own
habeas petition pro se and promptly filed it with the District Court.” Id. (quoting Holland v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010)). In contrast, the Pafe court continued, “Pafe . . .
waited nearly three years before hiring new attorneys to replace each of her ineffective ones
and did not file her motion to reopen until over five years after it was due. Accordingly,
Pafe has not shown even ‘reasonable diligence,’ and her petition for review is denied.” Id.
See also Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “the person
seeking equitable tolling [must demonstrate] reasonable diligence in attempting to file . . .
after the extraordinary circumstances began” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).
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Under this proposed rule there continues to be a consequence for the
prisoner who sits on his rights, thus this type of due diligence requirement
will still compel the prompt filings of habeas corpus petitions. Applying
the due diligence requirement in this way will serve the goal of judicial
efficiency, yet not at the expense of fairness and justice.
B. Utilizing Ethical Disciplinary Systems To Deter Attorney Default
“Ordinary negligence”335 should not be an acceptable standard of
conduct for the legal profession. Every jurisdiction requires attorneys to
comply with ethical rules, and has a disciplinary system to reprimand
attorneys who violate those rules.336 Courts and state bar associations have
the power to regulate lawyers using these disciplinary systems. In order to
treat prisoners fairly, while enhancing the integrity of the criminal justice
system by deterring attorney default, courts should utilize these disciplinary
systems in habeas litigation.
When an attorney fails to file a timely petition on behalf of a prisoner, the
Court itself stated that an attorney is violating professional ethical rules.337
Courts can therefore employ their disciplinary powers to reprimand
attorneys who violate their professional duties of care. The threat of
disciplinary proceedings is much more likely to influence attorney behavior
than the indirect punishment an attorney would theoretically receive in
precluding his client’s claims. As Justice William J. Brennan once
remarked, “directly sanctioning the attorney is not only fairer but more
effective in deterring violations” than sanctioning clients.338 In the postconviction context, criminal defense attorneys are typically public
defenders who are not regulated by their clients through malpractice
litigation or the demand in the market for legal services.339 Thus, it is left
to the courts and state bar associations to regulate criminal defense
attorneys. This method of discipline would obviate the need to punish
attorneys indirectly through their clients. Therefore, the court would be free
to apply equitable tolling for prisoners who failed to file timely habeas
petitions due solely to their attorney’s default.
Finally, directly disciplining attorneys, rather than precluding their
clients’ habeas corpus petitions, also serves AEDPA’s interest in making
habeas litigation more efficient.340 Some commentators argue that
foreclosing the use of equitable tolling for attorney default does not further
the goal of efficiency. Instead, they contend that the effect of AEDPA has
335. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2568 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (describing
an attorney’s “ordinary” as opposed to “gross” negligence).
336. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 26, at 1615.
337. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564–65; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
338. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 433 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
339. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
340. See Hearings on S. 623, supra note 41, at 2 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch)
(arguing that reform of the habeas adjudication process must stop prisoners from filing
spurious habeas corpus petitions in federal court); see also supra notes 43–47 and
accompanying text.
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not been to reduce the amount of habeas filings, but has merely changed the
nature of these filings.341 One commentator noted that “[AEDPA’s]
[p]rocedural requirements have resulted in years of litigation and timeconsuming adjudication of technical issues often unrelated to constitutional
protections.”342 Thus, by punishing clients rather than directly disciplining
the attorneys themselves, AEDPA’s statute of limitations has not had its
intended effect of making habeas litigation more efficient.
CONCLUSION
In the context of habeas litigation, a prisoner should not have to pay with
his life or liberty for an attorney’s mistake. The Court’s holding in Holland
was a step in the right direction for protecting the fairness of the habeas
corpus process, but did not go far enough in ensuring that attorneys do not
become barriers to a prisoner’s right to due process. Agency law is a
valuable tool for maintaining fairness in the relationship between principals,
agents, and third parties in civil litigation. However, the interests of justice
are not served by strictly applying agency principles in the post-conviction
context. Therefore, when an attorney becomes a barrier to the prisoner’s
pursuit of justice, the court must apply equitable tolling to AEDPA’s statute
of limitations.

341. See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 360–61; see also Habeas Reform: The Streamlined
Procedures Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 45–46 (2005)
(statement of Professor Eric M. Freedman, Hofstra Law School) (arguing that both speed
and accuracy of habeas proceedings are impaired by litigation over procedural issues that do
not address the merits of the claim).
342. See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 360–61. The fact that virtually every circuit court
of appeals and the Supreme Court have heard multiple cases regarding AEDPA and attorney
default, which have nothing to do with the merits of the prisoners’ habeas claims, is evidence
of this point. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

